[sudo-hall] OAK DAC & urgent action

[aestetix]

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FWIW, they will be doing an outreach to constituents sometime in
January to discuss privacy concerns. I'm apparently on the list,
unsure what that means. If I hear anything more I'll let everyone know.

Cheers,
aestetix

PS: greetings from Germany!

On 12/29/13 4:46 AM, eddan.com wrote:
> Included below is the East Bay Express' unbelievable exposé on the
> Domain Awareness Center being built in Oakland. While it is
> extraordinarily shocking what the plans are, it is within the
> dystopia scope of what civil rights advocates have been concerned
> about. But I think it is also amazingly shocking how much has been
> exposed and documented about it already.
> 
> These developments require a powerful response and should be a top
> priority for awareness raising in 2014. Not just protests, but
> serious and thoughtful articulation of the profound implications of
> this turning point of freedom in this country and specifically this
> city.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://m.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/the-real-purpose-of-oaklands-surveillance-center/Content?issue=3789180&oid=3789230
>
> 
> 
> 
> The Real Purpose of Oakland's Surveillance Center
> 
> City leaders have argued that Oakland needs a massive surveillance
> system to combat violent crime, but internal documents reveal that
> city staffers are also focused on tracking political protesters. by
> Darwin BondGraham and Ali Winston| December 18, 2013
> 
> Oakland's citywide surveillance system, the Domain Awareness
> Center, or DAC, gained national notoriety earlier this year when
> some city residents voiced strong concerns about the project's
> privacy and civil rights implications. City officials and
> supporters of the DAC have responded by contending that objections
> over privacy and civil rights issues are overblown and that the
> true purpose of the surveillance center is to help Oakland finally
> deal with its violent crime problem. But thousands of pages of
> emails, meeting minutes, and other public documents show that,
> behind closed doors, city staffers have not been focusing on how
> the DAC can lower Oakland's violent crime rate.
> 
> So what is the real purpose of the massive $10.9 million
> surveillance system? The records we examined show that the DAC is
> an open-ended project that would create a surveillance system that
> could watch the entire city and is designed to easily incorporate
> new high-tech features in the future. And one of the uses that has
> piqued the interest of city staffers is the deployment of the DAC
> to track political protesters and monitor large demonstrations.
> 
> Linda Lye, a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union
> of Northern California, was alarmed when we showed her emails that
> revealed that the Oakland Police Department has already started
> using the DAC to keep tabs on people engaged in First Amendment
> activity. "The fact that the focus so far has been on political
> protests, rather than the violent crime that's impacting Oakland
> residents, is troubling, and telling about how the city plans to
> use the DAC," she said.
> 
> "Information is always fundamentally about control," she added.
> Once it's fully operational, the DAC will give Oakland officials an
> unprecedented ability to monitor peoples' movements, associations,
> and activities.
> 
> The Domain Awareness Center is being built in stages and will merge
> OPD's existing license-plate scanners and gunshot detectors with
> video feeds from hundreds of surveillance cameras ? many already in
> place and some to be installed in the future by several different
> agencies throughout the city ? into a central hub. Oakland police
> will monitor this "flood of data," as one DAC project presentation
> called it. Originally limited to monitoring the Port of Oakland,
> the DAC has since expanded to encompass the entire city.
> 
> The Oakland Privacy Working Group, an activist coalition opposed to
> the DAC, obtained thousands of pages of emails and other public
> records related to the project from the city via a California
> Public Records Act request. The privacy group then shared the
> documents ? which cover the period from August 2012 through
> September 2013 ? with us.
> 
> While the emails reveal a great deal about the DAC, they are also
> notable for what they do not talk about. Among the hundreds of
> messages sent and received by Oakland staffers and the city's
> contractor team responsible for building the DAC, there is no
> mention of robberies, shootings, or the 138 homicides that took
> place during the period of time covered by the records. City
> staffers do not discuss any studies pertaining to the use of
> surveillance cameras in combating crime, nor do they discuss how
> the Domain Awareness System could help OPD with its longstanding
> problems with solving violent crimes. In more than 3,000 pages of
> emails, the terms "murder," "homicide," "assault," "robbery," and
> "theft" are never mentioned.
> 
> The records also show that the Oakland City Council's attempt to
> rein in the features of the DAC that pose the most serious threats
> to civil liberties, and to craft a privacy and data retention
> policy, may be too little, too late. City staffers have apparently
> found a way to work around the intended policies of the council.
> Moreover, the documents reveal that, behind the scenes, the Oakland
> Police Department, despite its long and troubling record of
> violating people's civil rights, is in charge of designing the DAC
> and the policies that will govern its use.
> 
> Furthermore, records show that the DAC already has so-called "video
> analytic" capabilities. Video analytics include features like
> automated vehicle and pedestrian tracking, motion recognition, and
> a "virtual fence" that determines when people approach or attempt
> to breach fences surrounding Port of Oakland property. The
> documents also reveal that the DAC contractor, SAIC, now called
> Leidos Holdings, Inc., over-billed the City of Oakland by upwards
> of $160,000 by purchasing expensive software and gadgets that SAIC
> staff kept for themselves, and by filing invoices for work that
> wasn't done. Several Oakland staffers caught this and deducted the
> charges, but only after forcing SAIC to exhaustively account for
> labor, tools, and $94,000 in goods received for which there were no
> receipts provided.
> 
> It's unclear just how much of Oakland will be put under continuous,
> pervasive surveillance by OPD with the DAC, but internal city
> records show that plans to incorporate cameras inside Oakland's
> public schools and Oakland Housing Authority properties are very
> much alive. So, too, are plans to feed in surveillance footage from
> hundreds of other cameras already in place around the city through
> OPD's commercial camera lending program, local transit agencies,
> and a planned surveillance system the Downtown Oakland Association
> and the Lake Merritt Uptown District Association business
> improvement districts intend to build.
> 
> And cameras are just the beginning: Documents mention monitoring
> "social media," "web feeds," and "text messaging."
> 
> Large surveillance centers are becoming increasingly common
> nationwide: They now exist in New York City; Chicago; Baltimore;
> Washington, DC; and Hudson County, New Jersey. Political leaders
> typically contend that such centers are necessary to combat
> terrorist threats and reduce crime.
> 
> But Rajiv Shah, a professor of communication at the University of
> Illinois-Chicago who conducted a study on the efficacy of Chicago
> police's crime cameras, said surveillance systems aren't guaranteed
> to help police reduce crime. They do, however, serve political
> goals of looking tough on crime.
> 
> In Chicago, the camera network was set up during the mid-2000s with
> no public input or oversight. And local officials justified it by
> pointing to the dual threats of terrorism and crime. But the
> latter, Shah said, is a red herring. "It's not really about solving
> crime," he said. "That's just something that's tacked on at the end
> to make it easier for the public to swallow." From a political
> perspective, he said, the questionable efficacy of networking
> cameras comes in second to the political currency of claiming
> credit for a brick-and-mortar project geared toward fighting
> violent crime. "It's like every local politician: 'I'll do
> something to create more jobs. I'll do something to reduce crime.
> I'll set up a camera system.'"
> 
> In Oakland, city leaders have also pointed to the city's high crime
> rate as the primary reason for building a surveillance center.
> Supporters of the DAC have also argued that the possibility of
> infringing on people's privacy or civil rights pales in comparison
> to the need to address violence in the city. "There are so many
> people in West Oakland who feel terrorized by gunplay and
> prostitution, gangs or just straight violence," said Councilmember
> Lynette Gibson McElhaney, whose district encompasses downtown and
> West Oakland.
> 
> There are a large number of residents in Oakland ? poor, rich,
> black, white, Latino, and Asian ? who desperately want something to
> be done about the violent crime that has taken thousands of mostly
> young African-American and Latino men to the grave over the past
> thirty years, and McElhaney said these communities support
> surveillance cameras.
> 
> But it's unclear whether residents understand how the DAC is going
> to be used. Civil rights attorney Jim Chanin, an Oakland resident
> who has been an integral part of the team involved in federal
> oversight of OPD for the past decade, said he's concerned about the
> police department's track record of misconduct and its history of
> disproportionately targeting people of color. "Under the right
> circumstances, [the DAC] could solve some crime, and help deter bad
> behavior by police, since they're still not using their [chest
> mounted cameras] properly," Chanin said. "However, if done wrong,
> the surveillance center will be a titanic waste of money. It will
> invade people's privacy and become a bureaucratic nightmare from
> managing so much data.
> 
> "There are fundamental problems with how OPD collects and handles
> evidence," he continued. "They can't even deal with the resources
> they have now."
> 
> Professor Shah's observations about the use of networked
> surveillance systems for purposes other than crime-fighting is
> borne out by official documents and correspondence tracing the
> evolution of Oakland's Domain Awareness Center. Public records show
> that city staffers are interested in using the DAC to monitor
> political protests. This aspect of the DAC first became public in
> August when Renee Domingo, director of Oakland's Emergency
> Management Services Division and the head of the DAC project team,
> published an article in the government trade publication Public CEO
> justifying the need for the surveillance hub. "Oakland's long
> history of civil discourse and protest adds to the need [for the
> Domain Awareness Center]," Domingo wrote. "The Oakland Emergency
> Operations Center has been partially or fully activated more than
> 30 times in the past three years to respond to large demonstrations
> and protests."
> 
> Other records echo this political mission. In meeting minutes from
> a January 2012 meeting of the San Francisco Maritime Exchange's
> Northern California Maritime Area Security Committee, Domingo and
> Mike O'Brien, director of security for the Port of Oakland,
> described the DAC system as a tool that would help control labor
> strikes and community protests that threaten to slow business at
> the port. Following security reports from the US Border Patrol and
> the FBI, Domingo told the committee that Oakland law enforcement
> was "hoping that things would quiet down with the Occupy movement
> in the new year," according to the official minutes. Domingo
> thanked the Maritime Exchange for its support of Oakland's port
> security grant projects, which includes the DAC.
> 
> O'Brien went further, explaining that the port's Emergency
> Operations Center (which now feeds into the DAC) "made use of
> seventy new security cameras" to track the protesters, and added
> that the system will ensure that "future actions [do] not scare
> labor away."
> 
> Dan Siegel, a longtime civil and workers' rights attorney in
> Oakland, said the city staffers' focus on political unrest, even at
> the port, is disturbing. "There's a huge difference in protecting
> the port from potential acts of terrorism than from spying on port
> workers and others who may have political or economic conflicts
> with port management and the companies that operate the terminals,"
> said Siegel. "What we see taking place is a complete blurring of
> that line where port security now includes tracking Occupy,
> longshore workers, and now recently the Port Truckers
> Association."
> 
> During construction of the first phase of the DAC, from roughly
> August 2012 to October 2013, city staffers repeatedly referred to
> political protests as a major reason for building the system.
> Emails to and from Lieutenant Christopher Shannon, Captain David
> Downing, and Lieutenant Nishant Joshi of OPD and Ahsan Baig,
> Oakland's technical project leader on the DAC, show that OPD
> staffers were in the surveillance center during the Trayvon Martin
> protests this year, and that they may have been monitoring marches
> in Oakland. In the same chain of emails, Shannon asked if the
> Emergency Operations Center and the DAC control room's layout had
> "changed much since May Day," referring to yet another large
> political rally in Oakland when the DAC appears to have been used
> by OPD to monitor demonstrations.
> 
> On July 25, Baig requested that SAIC produce a demonstration video
> of the DAC's capabilities to show off at the next City Council
> meeting. "Try your best. I need the Demo ASAP, it shouldn't be more
> than 3 mins.," wrote Baig. "Check out
> http://www.occupyoakland.orgwebsite to understand the background."
> 
> On July 31, dozens of Oakland residents attended a city council
> meeting to speak out against the DAC. The next day, Jerry Green, an
> employee of Radio IP, an Oakland contractor, emailed Baig a copy of
> a San Francisco Chronicle article entitled, "Oakland OKs Money For
> Surveillance Center," that described the protest. The title of
> Green's email was "these upset citizens must have something to
> hide." Baig responded simply, "Yep..."
> 
> Law enforcement surveillance (both federal and local) of
> demonstrators has been a constant in Oakland since the killing of
> Oscar Grant in 2009 sparked chaotic street demonstrations. Police
> infiltrated organizing meetings, sent undercover officers to mingle
> in crowds during several demonstrations, and recorded the protests
> with multiple video teams. Police took a similar approach during
> Occupy Oakland. Police also compiled yearbook-style photo dossiers
> of prominent demonstrators, regardless of whether they had
> committed a crime or not.
> 
> Siegel took issue with the DAC's focus on First Amendment activity.
> "The communications among Oakland city staff and DAC contractors
> demonstrate their intent to create a surveillance system that goes
> far beyond what might be used to detect terrorist threats and help
> the OPD solve serious crimes," he said.
> 
> "Instead, they are building a system that will be used to monitor
> political demonstrations and identify individuals involved in
> protests. The city's contractors betray their true attitudes by
> describing people opposed to state surveillance as 'upset citizens'
> with 'something to hide.'"
> 
> In August 2012, when port officials were brainstorming the extent
> of the DAC's surveillance powers, they hired a company called
> GuidePost Solutions to help. GuidePost Solutions has an office in
> Oakland, but is headquartered in Manhattan. Its executives include
> former officials from NYPD, the US Attorneys' office, the New York
> City District Attorneys' Office, and other law enforcement
> agencies. The DAC blueprint that GuidePost Solutions and the port
> devised to send to potential contractors as a Request for
> Qualifications (RFQ) drew the attention of Oakland police.
> 
> Lieutenant Michael Poirier read the plan and criticized it as being
> "too Port specific."
> 
> "While the DAC will of course serve the Port, I see the majority of
> information in/out will be 'live' on City streets," Poirier wrote
> in an email to port staffers and to Raymond Kolodzieczak of
> GuidePost Solutions. "This RFQ does not have the focus of 'live'
> operational information center."
> 
> Poirier recommended revising the project description to reflect
> OPD's plan to make the DAC a citywide system that includes "any
> City camera, shotspotter, LPR [automated license-plate readers],"
> and he even added, "City Databases (planning, permits, business
> tax, city GIS etc)" as information to be fed into the DAC.
> 
> Poirier ended his lengthy email stating, "If the RFQ goes out as
> is, I think the vendor will be 'surprised' when the true
> nature/function (operational mode) of the DAC is requested."
> 
> In public comments to the city council in July, Lye of the ACLU
> questioned whether there were any privacy policies in place to
> govern how the DAC would collect and store data. There were not.
> Lye met with city staffers to discuss the numerous ways the DAC
> could serve to undermine civil rights. She said she opposes
> construction of the DAC, and that her participation in those policy
> meetings should not be taken as ACLU's endorsement of the project.
> Councilmembers Dan Kalb and Libby Schaaf subsequently spearheaded a
> resolution requiring the city to develop a privacy and data
> retention policy, and for the rules to be in place by March, before
> the DAC becomes fully operational.
> 
> But the city is drafting the policy after the DAC has already been
> outfitted with the hardware and software necessary to store massive
> amounts of information, including video footage. In a July 26, 2013
> email from SAIC employee Neill Chung to port and city staffers
> concerning the privacy policy requested by the council, Chung
> asserted that the DAC "[does] not record or store any video." He
> then wrote exactly the opposite: "The [DAC] operators do have the
> ability to save a snapshot from a video and save it to the local
> workstation where they can then distribute the image," and further
> that they can also save and distribute video. "The [DAC] operators
> will have the ability to export a video clip and save it to the
> local workstation where they can then distribute the video."
> 
> In the same email conversation chain, Oakland project leader Baig
> referred to the DAC as having "TB of data storage," meaning
> terabytes. Standard DVDs hold 4.7 gigabytes of data, enough for a
> couple hours of high-definition digital footage. Many hours of
> lower-resolution video footage could be saved in just a few
> gigabytes. There are 1024 gigabytes in 1 terabyte. If Baig's claim
> that the DAC has terabytes of video storage capacity is correct,
> then the DAC is already outfitted with hardware to store the
> equivalent of at least 435 full-length movies. And the DAC's
> hardware likely has many more hours of storage capacity than that.
> 
> After the council approved Kalb and Schaaf's resolution requiring
> creation of a privacy policy, city staffers appear to have
> strategized a way to work around the council's intentions so that
> they can build upon these DAC features. In an email exchange on
> July 26 between Domingo and Amadis Sotelo, a lawyer in the City
> Attorney's Office, the two discussed their revisions to the privacy
> policy. Sotelo remarked that the resolution language under
> consideration "limits you from being able to develop and implement
> data retention at later times."
> 
> "Is that your intention?" Sotelo asked Domingo.
> 
> "No, we want the flexibility to do this after Council approves the
> Policy," replied Domingo.
> 
> Baig then cut into the email exchange, asking Domingo, "How are you
> going to change after the Council approval?"
> 
> Domingo responded, "We've done this before recently. Amadis and I
> will handle it."
> 
> "It looks like city staff thinks they have flexibility to alter the
> policy after council approves it," said Lye of ACLU. "That raises
> huge questions."
> 
> City staffers involved in the project and the email exchanges
> didn't return our phone calls and emails during the month we spent
> reporting this story. The project's contractors also declined to
> speak to us. Councilmembers Kalb and Schaaf also did not respond to
> repeated requests for comment.
> 
> Siegel reviewed the above email exchange and many other records at
> our request. "I think they're trying to pull the wool over the eyes
> of the city council and the ACLU about what data is stored and
> what's not," he said. He added that other records show that whether
> or not the city's policies end up allowing the DAC to centrally
> warehouse video, the footage will still be saved and accessible.
> "They'll have incident markers, links that allow them to pull up
> footage from its source," he said. "So what difference does it make
> if they're storing it in the DAC or not?"
> 
> The city's data retention policy is currently being drafted by the
> Oakland Police Department under the supervision of Deputy Chief
> Eric Breshears and the City Attorney's Office.
> 
> Oakland resident Mary Madden, a member of the Oakland Privacy
> Working Group, opposes the DAC unequivocally. She said OPD's role
> in the surveillance system's construction and in drafting privacy
> policies raises even more problems. "If Oakland would like to give
> the impression of caring about privacy, they should have the
> privacy guidelines crafted by an independent privacy expert, who
> understands the complex issues at stake, as well as the full DAC
> system and all its components," she said. "OPD has a history of not
> following their own rules, as the federal monitor pointed out.
> Examples include the crowd control policy and use of lapel cameras,
> so how can we trust OPD to follow their own privacy rules for the
> DAC?"
> 
> Once the Domain Awareness Center's Phase 2 construction is finished
> in July 2014, the center could link an untold number of public and
> private video cameras from businesses, traffic intersections,
> public housing properties, highways and onramps, transit stations,
> sports facilities, and public schools into a centralized hub. The
> DAC will also collect OPD's automated license-plate reader data,
> ShotSpotter gunshot detectors, and social media feeds ? all to be
> monitored on a live basis.
> 
> July 2013 emails between SAIC project manager Taso Zografos and
> Chris Millar, a contractor hired to help oversee the DAC, identify
> sources of data and surveillance capabilities that would be built
> into the DAC in several phases. According to the emails, the first
> phase of "prioritized integrations" included the port's vehicle
> tracking system and its mapping systems, weather and seismic
> warnings, and video from BART and the Oakland Airport. The second
> group of "prioritized integrations" included police and fire
> dispatch, automatic vehicle location systems for OPD and OFD
> vehicles, video from Caltrans and California Highway Patrol
> cameras, and unspecified informational links between the DAC and
> two law enforcement "fusion centers" ? hubs in which law
> enforcement intelligence is centralized ? including the Northern
> California Regional Information Center. Oakland officials are also
> considering applying for grant funding for the DAC on the basis
> that it also operates as a fusion center. Such a designation could
> open up the DAC for funding sources additional to the federal
> grants that have bankrolled it to date.
> 
> According to the emails, "potential integrations" into the DAC
> include video feeds from the Oakland Coliseum, Oakland's red-light
> cameras, AC Transit, BART, city libraries, City Hall, Oakland
> Housing Authority properties, buildings owned by the Oakland
> Unified School District, and OPD's automated license-plate
> readers.
> 
> If the public housing, school, and public transit cameras are
> incorporated into the DAC, Oakland's communities of color could be
> placed under disproportionately intense surveillance. "In many
> instances, surveillance issues aren't just privacy issues; they're
> also racial justice issues," said Lye. "This means we're going to
> have complete surveillance of communities of color when they're
> going about their lives and doing nothing wrong whatsoever."
> 
> A critical component of the Domain Awareness Center will be "video
> analytics," or software that can interpret raw information from
> video streams and identify certain behavior or characteristics. The
> port already uses motion-detection software and image recognition
> around port property as part of a virtual fence that alerts
> staffers if someone is approaching facilities that are off-limits
> to the public. Emails between city and port officials in May
> revealed that port staffers have programmed port cameras to send
> email alerts when the video analytics detect cars engaged in street
> racing on Middle Harbor Road. The new technology has not put a halt
> to the chaotic and occasionally violent races.
> 
> The most controversial form of video analytics is facial
> recognition software that is programmed to automatically identify
> persons based on unique facial features. Source databases for
> facial recognition programs include employee records, DMV photos,
> and mugshots from law enforcement booking systems. The city council
> voted in July to bar the use of facial recognition during the DAC's
> current funding phase. However, facial recognition for
> closed-circuit television systems is rapidly gaining popularity
> among law enforcement. In January 2013, the Los Angeles Police
> Department began testing mobile surveillance cameras equipped with
> facial recognition software in the San Fernando Valley, with the
> intent of identifying known or wanted criminals. The Chicago Office
> of Emergency Services has also experimented with facial recognition
> programming for its 24,000 networked cameras, using Cook County's
> 4.5 million booking photos as the data source. In May, Chicago
> police officers made their first arrest with the help of facial
> recognition technology.
> 
> Shah of the University of Illinois-Chicago noted that the combined
> use of facial recognition technology and license-plate readers,
> which would be possible if the former technology is used in
> conjunction with the Oakland surveillance center, have the
> potential to take individual tracking to an unprecedented level.
> "Facial recognition and LPR directly tie to someone ? [it's] what
> causes the most concern," said Shah.
> 
> The DAC is only one of several surveillance systems in progress in
> Oakland. In June 2012, then-Oakland Police Chief Howard Jordan and
> then-Assistant Chief Anthony Toribio met with representatives of
> the Total Recall Corporation, a firm marketing a surveillance
> system called CrimeEye. Total Recall's cameras can zoom in from
> great distances, and can store footage for as long as a police
> department wants. If OPD opts to buy this camera unit and software
> package, a single unit at the intersection of 14th Street and
> Broadway could have a range east to Lake Merritt, north to the
> Paramount Theater, and south and west to Interstate 880, according
> to materials the company provided to the city that we obtained.
> 
> In August, then-Oakland Chamber of Commerce Vice President Paul
> Junge and city staffer Joe DeVries exchanged emails about
> incorporating cameras owned and operated by the Downtown Oakland
> Association and Lake Merritt Uptown District Association business
> improvement districts into the Domain Awareness Center during phase
> three of the DAC construction in June 2014. DeVries also mentioned
> the possibility of including cameras installed by various
> neighborhood associations in the DAC.
> 
> Documents we obtained also reveal the Uptown and downtown BIDs are
> building their own surveillance center, and have submitted a
> $30,000 grant application to the MetLife Foundation to fund it. At
> some future date these cameras are also to be linked into the DAC.
> 
> In an influential 2012 paper about police surveillance
> technologies, Georgetown University law professor Laura Donohue
> observed that surveillance advances like facial recognition,
> vehicle tracking, and networked video monitoring are altering the
> nature of American society. "What we are witnessing is a sea change
> in how we think about individuals in public space," Donohue wrote.
> While Oakland's elected officials and city staff struggle with how
> to regulate this sprawling surveillance project, abstract issues
> such as privacy and security have become immediate and concrete for
> many city residents.
> 
> But the courts, as Donohue noted, are decades behind the newly
> ubiquitous surveillance methods. In one recent case ? US v. Jones ?
> that bought the law partly up to speed, the DC Court of Appeals
> ruled that law enforcement officers violated the Constitution by
> placing GPS trackers on vehicles without warrants. (This ruling was
> later upheld by the US Supreme Court.) In the unanimous US v. Jones
> decision, DC Court of Appeals Justice Douglas Ginsberg wrote of the
> incredible power modern technology affords law enforcement: "A
> person who knows all of another's travels can deduce whether he is
> a weekly churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an
> unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
> associate of particular individuals or political groups ? and not
> just one fact about a person, but all such facts."
> 
> The DAC, if completed as it's currently designed, will make Judge
> Ginsberg's scenarios a reality in Oakland.
> 
> 
> Included below is the East Bay Express' unbelievable exposé on the
> Domain Awareness Center being built in Oakland. While it is
> extraordinarily shocking what the plans are, it is within the
> dystopia scope of what civil rights advocates have been concerned
> about. It is also amazingly shocking how much has been exposed and
> documented about it already.
> 
> These developments require a powerful response and should be a top
> priority for awareness raising in 2014. Not just protests, but
> serious and thoughtful articulation of the profound implications of
> this turning point of freedom in this country and specifically this
> city.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> sent from eddan.com
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ Hall mailing list 
> Hall at lists.sudoroom.org http://lists.sudoroom.org/listinfo/hall
> 

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