[Mesh] Fwd: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh network for surveillance?

Sun Nov 10 14:04:27 PST 2013

Hi!

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Mitar

> So how does one use a mesh network without letting anyone know where you
> are? Seems like it is the nature of mesh that the network will know what
> mesh nodes you are near.
> 
> -steve
> 
> 
> On Sun, Nov 10, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Mitar <mitar at tnode.com> wrote:
> 
>> Hi!
>>
>> We don't. They have to protect themselves end-to-end. They should never
>> be trusting us or anybody else.
>>
>>
>> Mitar
>>
>>> Couldn't a community mesh network be suspected of having the same sort of
>>> tracking abilities?
>>> How do we convince potential mesh network users that we aren't collecting
>>> location data on them?
>>>
>>> Steve
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, November 8, 2013, Jenny Ryan wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: Preston Rhea <prestonrhea at opentechinstitute.org<javascript:_e({},
>>>> 'cvml', 'prestonrhea at opentechinstitute.org');>>
>>>> Date: Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 6:49 AM
>>>> Subject: Fwd: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh network for
>>>> surveillance?
>>>> To: Jenny Ryan <jenny at thepyre.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
>>>> 'jenny at thepyre.org');>>, Shaun Houlihan <shaunhoulihan at gmail.com<javascript:_e({},
>> 'cvml', 'shaunhoulihan at gmail.com');>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thought this would interest y'all, I don't know if you are already on
>>>> the Commotion listserv Jenny.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: Dan Staples <danstaples at opentechinstitute.org <javascript:_e({},
>>>> 'cvml', 'danstaples at opentechinstitute.org');>>
>>>> Date: Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 9:32 PM
>>>> Subject: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh network for
>> surveillance?
>>>> To: commotion-discuss <commotion-discuss at lists.chambana.net<javascript:_e({},
>> 'cvml', 'commotion-discuss at lists.chambana.net');>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>> http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/you-are-a-rogue-device/Content?oid=18143845
>>>>
>>>> You Are a Rogue Device
>>>> A New Apparatus Capable of Spying on You Has Been Installed Throughout
>>>> Downtown Seattle. Very Few Citizens Know What It Is, and Officials Don’t
>>>> Want to Talk About It.
>>>>
>>>> by Matt Fikse-Verkerk and Brendan Kiley
>>>>
>>>> If you're walking around downtown Seattle, look up: You'll see off-white
>>>> boxes, each one about a foot tall with vertical antennae, attached to
>>>> utility poles. If you're walking around downtown while looking at a
>>>> smartphone, you will probably see at least one—and more likely two or
>>>> three—Wi-Fi networks named after intersections: "4th&Seneca,"
>>>> "4th&Union," "4th&University," and so on. That is how you can see the
>>>> Seattle Police Department's new wireless mesh network, bought from a
>>>> California-based company called Aruba Networks, whose clients include
>>>> the Department of Defense, school districts in Canada, oil-mining
>>>> interests in China, and telecommunications companies in Saudi Arabia.
>>>>
>>>> The question is: How well can this mesh network see you?
>>>>
>>>> How accurately can it geo-locate and track the movements of your phone,
>>>> laptop, or any other wireless device by its MAC address (its "media
>>>> access control address"—nothing to do with Macintosh—which is analogous
>>>> to a device's thumbprint)? Can the network send that information to a
>>>> database, allowing the SPD to reconstruct who was where at any given
>>>> time, on any given day, without a warrant? Can the network see you now?
>>>>
>>>> The SPD declined to answer more than a dozen questions from The
>>>> Stranger, including whether the network is operational, who has access
>>>> to its data, what it might be used for, and whether the SPD has used it
>>>> (or intends to use it) to geo-locate people's devices via their MAC
>>>> addresses or other identifiers.
>>>>
>>>> Seattle Police detective Monty Moss, one of the leaders of the
>>>> mesh-network project—one part of a $2.7 million effort, paid for by the
>>>> Department of Homeland Security—wrote in an e-mail that the department
>>>> "is not comfortable answering policy questions when we do not yet have a
>>>> policy." But, Detective Moss added, the SPD "is actively collaborating
>>>> with the mayor's office, city council, law department, and the ACLU on a
>>>> use policy." The ACLU, at least, begs to differ: "Actively
>>>> collaborating" is not how they would put it. Jamela Debelak, technology
>>>> and liberty director of the Seattle office, says the ACLU submitted
>>>> policy-use suggestions months ago and has been waiting for a response.
>>>>
>>>> Detective Moss also added that the mesh network would not be used for
>>>> "surveillance purposes... without City Council's approval and the
>>>> appropriate court authorization." Note that he didn't say the mesh
>>>> network couldn't be used for the surveillance functions we asked about,
>>>> only that it wouldn't—at least until certain people in power say it can.
>>>> That's the equivalent of a "trust us" and a handshake.
>>>>
>>>> His answer is inadequate for other reasons as well. First, the city
>>>> council passed an ordinance earlier this year stating that any potential
>>>> surveillance equipment must submit protocols to the city council for
>>>> public review and approval within 30 days of its acquisition and
>>>> implementation. This mesh network has been around longer than that, as
>>>> confirmed by Cascade Networks, Inc., which helped install it. Still, the
>>>> SPD says it doesn't have a policy for its use yet. Mayor McGinn's office
>>>> says it expects to see draft protocols sometime in December—nearly nine
>>>> months late, according to the new ordinance.
>>>>
>>>> Second, and more importantly, this mesh network is part of a whole new
>>>> arsenal of surveillance technologies that are moving faster than the
>>>> laws that govern them are being written. As Stephanie K. Pell (former
>>>> counsel to the House Judiciary Committee) and Christopher Soghoian
>>>> (senior policy analyst at the ACLU) wrote in a 2012 essay for the
>>>> Berkeley Technology Law Journal:
>>>>
>>>>     The use of location information by law enforcement agencies is
>>>> common and becoming more so as technological improvements enable
>>>> collection of more accurate and precise location data. The legal mystery
>>>> surrounding the proper law enforcement access standard for prospective
>>>> location data remains unsolved. This mystery, along with conflicting
>>>> rulings over the appropriate law enforcement access standards for both
>>>> prospective and historical location data, has created a messy,
>>>> inconsistent legal landscape where even judges in the same district may
>>>> require law enforcement to meet different standards to compel location
>>>> data.
>>>>
>>>> In other words, law enforcement has new tools—powerful tools. We didn't
>>>> ask for them, but they're here. And nobody knows the rules for how they
>>>> should be used.
>>>>
>>>> This isn't the first time the SPD has purchased surveillance equipment
>>>> (or, as they might put it, public-safety equipment that happens to have
>>>> powerful surveillance capabilities) without telling the rest of the
>>>> city. There was the drones controversy this past winter, when the public
>>>> and elected officials discovered that the SPD had bought two unmanned
>>>> aerial vehicles with the capacity to spy on citizens. There was an
>>>> uproar, and a few SPD officers embarked on a mea culpa tour of community
>>>> meetings where they answered questions and endured (sometimes raucous)
>>>> criticism. In February, Mayor Mike McGinn announced he was grounding the
>>>> drones, but a new mayor could change his mind. Those SPD drones are
>>>> sitting somewhere right now on SPD property.
>>>>
>>>> Meanwhile, the SPD was also dealing with the port-camera surveillance
>>>> scandal. That kicked off in late January, when people in West Seattle
>>>> began wondering aloud about the 30 cameras that had appeared unannounced
>>>> on utility poles along the waterfront. The West Seattle neighborhood
>>>> blog (westseattleblog.com) sent questions to city utility companies,
>> and
>>>> the utilities in turn pointed at SPD, which eventually admitted that it
>>>> had purchased and installed 30 surveillance cameras with federal money
>>>> for "port security." That resulted in an additional uproar and another
>>>> mea culpa tour, much like they did with the drones, during which
>>>> officers repeated that they should have done a better job of educating
>>>> the public about what they were up to with the cameras on Alki.
>>>> (Strangely, the Port of Seattle and the US Coast Guard didn't seem very
>>>> involved in this "port security" project—their names only appear in a
>>>> few cursory places in the budgets and contracts. The SPD is clearly the
>>>> driving agency behind the project. For example, their early tests of
>>>> sample Aruba products—beginning with a temporary Aruba mesh network set
>>>> up in Pioneer Square for Mardi Gras in 2009—didn't have anything to do
>>>> with the port whatsoever.)
>>>>
>>>> The cameras attracted the controversy, but they were only part of the
>>>> project. In fact, the 30 pole-mounted cameras on Alki that caused the
>>>> uproar cost $82,682—just 3 percent of the project's $2.7 million
>>>> Homeland Security–funded budget. The project's full title was "port
>>>> security video surveillance system with wireless mesh network." People
>>>> raised a fuss about the cameras. But what about the mesh network?
>>>>
>>>> Detective Moss and Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh mentioned the downtown
>>>> mesh network during those surveillance-camera community meetings, saying
>>>> it would help cops and firefighters talk to each other by providing a
>>>> wireless network for their exclusive use, with the potential for others
>>>> to use overlaid networks handled by the same equipment. (Two-way radios
>>>> already allow police officers to talk to each other, but officers still
>>>> use wireless networks to access data, such as the information an officer
>>>> looks for by running your license plate number when you've been pulled
>>>> over.)
>>>>
>>>> As Brian Magnuson of Cascade Networks, Inc., which helped install the
>>>> Aruba system, explained the possible use of such a system: "A normal
>>>> cell-phone network is a beautiful thing right up until the time you
>>>> really need it—say you've just had an earthquake or a large storm, and
>>>> then what happens? Everybody picks up their phone and overloads the
>>>> system." The network is most vulnerable precisely when it's most needed.
>>>> A mesh network could be a powerful tool for streaming video from
>>>> surveillance cameras or squad car dash-cams across the network, allowing
>>>> officers "real-time situational awareness" even when other communication
>>>> systems have been overloaded, as Detective Moss explained in those
>>>> community meetings.
>>>>
>>>> But the Aruba mesh network is not just for talking, it's also for
>> tracking.
>>>>
>>>> After reviewing Aruba's technical literature, as well as talking to IT
>>>> directors and systems administrators around the country who work with
>>>> Aruba products, it's clear that their networks are adept at seeing all
>>>> the devices that move through their coverage area and visually mapping
>>>> the locations of those devices in real time for the system
>>>> administrators' convenience. In fact, one of Aruba's major selling
>>>> points is its ability to locate "rogue" or "unassociated" devices—that
>>>> is, any device that hasn't been authorized by (and maybe hasn't even
>>>> asked to be part of) the network.
>>>>
>>>> Which is to say, your device. The cell phone in your pocket, for
>> instance.
>>>>
>>>> The user's guide for one of Aruba's recent software products states:
>>>> "The wireless network has a wealth of information about unassociated and
>>>> associated devices." That software includes "a location engine that
>>>> calculates associated and unassociated device location every 30 seconds
>>>> by default... The last 1,000 historical locations are stored for each
>>>> MAC address."
>>>>
>>>> For now, Seattle's mesh network is concentrated in the downtown area.
>>>> But the SPD has indicated in PowerPoint presentations—also acquired by
>>>> The Stranger—that it hopes to eventually have "citywide deployment" of
>>>> the system that, again, has potential surveillance capabilities that the
>>>> SPD declined to answer questions about. That could give a whole new
>>>> meaning to the phrase "real-time situational awareness."
>>>>
>>>> So how does Aruba's mesh network actually function?
>>>>
>>>> Each of those off-white boxes you see downtown is a wireless access
>>>> point (AP) with four radios inside it that work to shove giant amounts
>>>> of data to, through, and around the network, easily handling
>>>> bandwidth-hog uses such as sending live, high-resolution video to or
>>>> from moving vehicles. Because this grid of APs forms a latticelike mesh,
>>>> it works like the internet itself, routing traffic around bottlenecks
>>>> and "self-healing" by sending traffic around components that fail.
>>>>
>>>> As Brian Magnuson at Cascade Networks explains: "When you have 10 people
>>>> talking to an AP, no problem. If you have 50, that's a problem." Aruba's
>>>> mesh solution is innovative—instead of building a few high-powered,
>>>> herculean APs designed to withstand an immense amount of traffic, Aruba
>>>> sprinkles a broad area with lots of lower-powered APs and lets them
>>>> figure out the best way to route all the data by talking to each other.
>>>>
>>>> Aruba's technology is considered cutting-edge because its systems are
>>>> easy to roll out, administer, and integrate with other systems, and its
>>>> operating system visualizes what's happening on the network in a simple,
>>>> user-friendly digital map. The company is one of many firms in the
>>>> networking business, but, according to the tech-ranking firm Gartner,
>>>> Aruba ranks second (just behind Cisco) in "completeness of vision" and
>>>> third in "ability to execute" for its clever ways of getting around
>>>> technical hurdles.
>>>>
>>>> Take Candlestick Park, the San Francisco 49ers football stadium, which,
>>>> Magnuson says, is just finishing up an Aruba mesh network installation.
>>>> The stadium has high-intensity cellular service needs—70,000 people can
>>>> converge there for a single event in one of the most high-tech cities in
>>>> America, full of high-powered, newfangled devices. "Aruba's solution was
>>>> ingenious," Magnuson says. It put 640 low-power APs under the stadium's
>>>> seats to diffuse the data load. "If you're at the stadium and trying to
>>>> talk to an AP," Magnuson says, "you're probably sitting on it!"
>>>>
>>>> Another one of Aruba's selling points is its ability to detect rogue
>>>> devices—strangers to the system. Its promotional "case studies" trumpet
>>>> this capability, including one report about Cabela's hunting and
>>>> sporting goods chain, which is an Aruba client: "Because Cabela's stores
>>>> are in central shopping areas, the company captures huge quantities of
>>>> rogue data—as many as 20,000 events per day, mostly from neighboring
>>>> businesses." Aruba's network is identifying and distinguishing which
>>>> devices are allowed on the Cabela's network and which are within the
>>>> coverage area but are just passing through. The case study also
>>>> describes how Cabela's Aruba network was able to locate a lost
>>>> price-scanner gun in a large warehouse by mapping its location, as well
>>>> as track employees by the devices they were carrying.
>>>>
>>>> It's one thing for a privately owned company to register devices it
>>>> already owns with a network. It's another for a local police department
>>>> to scale up that technology to blanket an entire downtown—or an entire
>>>> city.
>>>>
>>>> Aruba also sells a software product called "Analytics and Location
>>>> Engine 1.0." According to a document Aruba has created about the
>>>> product, ALE "calculates the location of associated and unassociated
>>>> wifi devices... even though a device has not associated to the network,
>>>> information about it is available. This includes the MAC address,
>>>> location, and RSSI information." ALE's default setting is anonymous,
>>>> which "allows for unique user tracking without knowing who the
>>>> individual user is." But, Aruba adds in the next sentence, "optionally
>>>> the anonymization can be disabled for richer analytics and user behavior
>>>> tracking." The network has the ability to see who you are—how deeply it
>>>> looks is up to whoever's using it. (The Aruba technology, as far as we
>>>> know, does not automatically associate a given MAC address with the name
>>>> on the device's account. But figuring out who owns the account—by asking
>>>> a cell-phone company, for example—would not be difficult for a
>>>> law-enforcement agency.)
>>>>
>>>> Geo-location seems to be an area of intense interest for Aruba. Last
>>>> week, the Oregonian announced that Aruba had purchased a Portland
>>>> mapping startup called Meridian, which, according to the article, has
>>>> developed software that "pinpoints a smartphone's location inside a
>>>> venue, relying either on GPS technology or with localized wireless
>>>> networks." The technology, the article says, "helps people find their
>>>> way within large buildings, such as malls, stadiums, or airports and
>>>> enables marketing directed at a phone's precise location."
>>>>
>>>> How does that geo-location work? Devices in the network's coverage area
>>>> are "heard" by more than one radio in those APs (the off-white boxes).
>>>> Once the network hears a device from multiple APs, it can compare the
>>>> strength and timing of the signal to locate where the device is. This is
>>>> classic triangulation, and users of Aruba's AirWave software—as in the
>>>> Cabela's example—report that their systems are able to locate devices to
>>>> within a few feet.
>>>>
>>>> In the case of large, outdoor installations where APs are more spread
>>>> out, the ability to know what devices are passing through is
>>>> useful—especially, perhaps, to policing agencies, which could log that
>>>> data for long-term storage. As networking products and their uses
>>>> continue to evolve, they will only compound the "legal mystery" around
>>>> how this technology could and should be used that Pell and Soghoian
>>>> described in their Berkeley Technology Law Journal piece. Aruba's mesh
>>>> network is state-of-the-art, but something significantly smarter and
>>>> more sensitive will surely be on the market this time next year. And who
>>>> knows how much better the software will get.
>>>>
>>>> An official spokesperson for Aruba wrote in an e-mail that the company
>>>> could not answer The Stranger's questions because they pertained "to a
>>>> new product announcement" that would not happen until Thanksgiving.
>>>> "Aruba's technology," the spokesperson added, "is designed for indoor
>>>> (not outdoor) usage and is for consumer apps where they opt in." This is
>>>> in direct contradiction to Aruba's own user's manuals, as well as the
>>>> fact that the Seattle Police Department installed an outdoor Aruba mesh
>>>> network earlier this year.
>>>>
>>>> One engineer familiar with Aruba products and similar systems—who
>>>> requested anonymity—confirmed that the mesh network and its software are
>>>> powerful tools. "But like anything," the engineer said, it "can be used
>>>> inappropriately... You can easily see how a user might abuse this
>>>> ability (network admin has a crush on user X, monitors user X's location
>>>> specifically)." As was widely reported earlier this year, such alleged
>>>> abuses within the NSA have included a man who spied on nine women over a
>>>> five-year period, a woman who spied on prospective boyfriends, a man who
>>>> spied on his girlfriend, a husband who spied on his wife, and even a man
>>>> who spied on his ex-girlfriend "on his first day of access to the NSA's
>>>> surveillance system," according to the Washington Post. The practice was
>>>> so common within the NSA, it got its own classification: "LOVEINT."
>>>>
>>>> Other Aruba clients—such as a university IT director, a university vice
>>>> president, and systems administrators—around the country confirmed it
>>>> wouldn't be difficult to use the mesh network to track the movement of
>>>> devices by their MAC addresses, and that building a historical database
>>>> of their movements would be relatively trivial from a data-storage
>>>> perspective.
>>>>
>>>> As Bruce Burton, an information technology manager at the University of
>>>> Cincinnati (which uses an Aruba network), put it in an e-mail: "This
>>>> mesh network will have the capability to track devices (MAC addresses)
>>>> throughout the city."
>>>>
>>>> Not that the SPD would do that—but we don't know. "We definitely feel
>>>> like the public doesn't have a handle on what the capabilities are,"
>>>> says Debelak of the ACLU. "We're not even sure the police department
>>>> does." It all depends on what the SPD says when it releases its
>>>> mesh-network protocols.
>>>>
>>>> "They're long overdue," says Lee Colleton, a systems administrator at
>>>> Google who is also a member of the Seattle Privacy Coalition, a
>>>> grassroots group that formed in response to SPD's drone and
>>>> surveillance-camera controversies. "If we don't deal with this kind of
>>>> thing now, and establish norms and policies, we'll find ourselves in an
>>>> unpleasant situation down the road that will be harder to change."
>>>>
>>>> The city is already full of surveillance equipment. The Seattle
>>>> Department of Transportation, for example, uses license-plate scanners,
>>>> sensors embedded in the pavement, and other mechanisms to monitor
>>>> individual vehicles and help estimate traffic volume and wait time. "But
>>>> as soon as that data is extrapolated," says Adiam Emery of SDOT, "it's
>>>> gone." They couldn't turn it over to a judge if they tried.
>>>>
>>>> Not that license-plate scanners have always been so reliable. Doug Honig
>>>> of the ACLU remembers a story he heard from a former staffer a couple of
>>>> years ago about automatic license-plate readers on police cars in
>>>> Spokane. Automatic license-plate readers "will read a chain-link fence
>>>> as XXXXX," Honig says, "which at the time also matched the license plate
>>>> of a stolen car in Mississippi, resulting in a number of false alerts to
>>>> pull over the fence."
>>>>
>>>> Seattle's mesh network is only one instance in a trend of Homeland
>>>> Security funding domestic surveillance equipment. Earlier this month,
>>>> the New York Times ran a story about a $7 million Homeland Security
>>>> grant earmarked for "port security"—just like the SPD's mesh-network
>>>> funding—in Oakland.
>>>>
>>>> "But instead," the Times reports, "the money is going to a police
>>>> initiative that will collect and analyze reams of surveillance data from
>>>> around town—from gunshot- detection sensors in the barrios of East
>>>> Oakland to license plate readers mounted on police cars patrolling the
>>>> city's upscale hills."
>>>>
>>>> The Oakland "port security" project, which the Times reports was
>>>> formerly known as the "Domain Awareness Center," will "electronically
>>>> gather data around the clock from a variety of sensors and databases,
>>>> analyze that data, and display some of the information on a bank of
>>>> giant monitors." The Times doesn't detail what kind of "sensors and
>>>> databases" the federally funded "port security" project will pay for,
>>>> but perhaps it's something like Seattle's mesh network with its ability
>>>> to ping, log, and visually map the movement of devices in and out of its
>>>> coverage area.
>>>>
>>>> Which brings up some corollary issues, ones with implications much
>>>> larger than the SPD's ability to call up a given time on a given day and
>>>> see whether you were at work, at home, at someone's else home, at a bar,
>>>> or at a political demonstration: What does it mean when money from a
>>>> federal agency like the Department of Homeland Security is being
>>>> funneled to local police departments like SPD to purchase and use
>>>> high-powered surveillance gear?
>>>>
>>>> For federal surveillance projects, the NSA and other federal spying
>>>> organizations have at least some oversight—as flawed as it may be—from
>>>> the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (also known as the FISA
>>>> court) and the US Congress. But local law enforcement doesn't have that
>>>> kind of oversight and, in Seattle at least, has been buying and
>>>> installing DHS-funded surveillance equipment without explaining what
>>>> it's up to. The city council's surveillance ordinance earlier this year
>>>> was an attempt to provide local oversight on that kind of policing, but
>>>> it has proven toothless.
>>>>
>>>> It's reasonable to assume that locally gleaned information will be
>>>> shared with other organizations, including federal ones. An SPD diagram
>>>> of the mesh network, for example, shows its information heading to
>>>> institutions large and small, including the King County Sheriff's
>>>> Office, the US Coast Guard, and our local fusion center.
>>>>
>>>> Fusion centers, if you're unfamiliar with the term, are
>>>> information-sharing hubs, defined by the Department of Homeland Security
>>>> as "focal points" for the "receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing" of
>>>> surveillance information.
>>>>
>>>> If federally funded, locally built surveillance systems with little to
>>>> no oversight can dump their information in a fusion center—think of it
>>>> as a gun show for surveillance, where agencies freely swap information
>>>> with little restriction or oversight—that could allow federal agencies
>>>> such as the FBI and the NSA to do an end-run around any limitations set
>>>> by Congress or the FISA court.
>>>>
>>>> If that's their strategy in Seattle, Oakland, and elsewhere, it's an
>>>> ingenious one—instead of maintaining a few high-powered, herculean
>>>> surveillance agencies designed to digest an immense amount of traffic
>>>> and political scrutiny, the federal government could sprinkle an entire
>>>> nation with lots of low-powered surveillance nodes and let them figure
>>>> out the best way to route the data by talking to each other. By
>>>> diffusing the way the information flows, they can make it flow more
>>>> efficiently.
>>>>
>>>> It's an innovative solution—much like the Aruba mesh network itself.
>>>>
>>>> The Department of Homeland Security has not responded to requests for
>>>> comment.
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Dan Staples
>>>>
>>>> Open Technology Institute
>>>> https://commotionwireless.net
>>>> OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc
>>>> Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Commotion-discuss mailing list
>>>> Commotion-discuss at lists.chambana.net <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
>>>> 'Commotion-discuss at lists.chambana.net');>
>>>> https://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/commotion-discuss
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Preston Rhea
>>>> Field Analyst, Open Technology Institute
>>>> New America Foundation
>>>> +1-202-570-9770
>>>> Twitter: @prestonrhea
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
>>
>> --
>> http://mitar.tnode.com/
>> https://twitter.com/mitar_m
>>
> 
> 
> 

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