[Mesh] Changing your MAC address

[rhodey]

Last week Mitar pointed out that many of the tricks we're theorize are
effectively turning our layer 2 mesh into something of a layer 3 mesh. I
want to acknowledge this insight while expressing my interest in
continuing these experiments because I think layer 2 has been out of
sight out of mind for too long (at least for me). I hope that we can
continue forward with our current deployment plan and once complete use
it as a test platform for all these crazy hacks we're theorizing :)

> I'm also now skeptical that a malicious network couldn't work around
> any of these tricks as long as you remain in their range. If one
> device appears as soon as the other leaves, at the same location, they
> can make a good guess that it's still you.

Following the general idea of mesh nodes maintaining a translation table
for the purpose of masking real, static MAC addresses with fake MAC
addresses-- why can't the "fake" MAC addresses be static. We could
allocate each node in our network a generous chunk of the MAC address
space which it could map to clients as they connect. Maintaining this
translation table would add complexity but I believe that it could also
remove some complexity from the routing protocol because of the static
address space.

If we accept the above idea and trust nodes to manage a static block of
the address space we also gain the option of adding trust into the
network. There is currently nothing stopping a malicious node on a
BATMAN-adv network from advertising that it has clients which it does
not-- BUT if we accept that nodes control a static address space we
defeat this attack. I believe this trust would have to be maintained
between nodes and transparent to clients because of our lack of control
over the client network stack, but I think this might be OK. A remaining
problem is to implement this system of trust without ruining the
decentralized nature of the mesh.

I get the impression that a lot of what we're theorizing has
implications to roaming between networks but if we are able to establish
trust between nodes I think we might not break everything. Either way, I
need to educate myself on roaming.

--
-- rhodey ˙ ͜ʟ˙

On 11/21/2013 01:11 PM, Yardena Cohen wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 10:50 PM, Mitar <mitar at tnode.com> wrote:
>> I would be more interested in what happens to the arp table. Does it grow?
> 
> It appears to be staying up-to-date. At this very moment there are 5
> obsolete dhcp leases hanging around, but none shows up in
> /proc/net/arp
> 
> After a week of this, I'm wondering if it's better to dissociate this
> stuff entirely from the network logic. Maybe all interfaces should
> just be randomized at boot time and/or every 24 hours, no matter what
> the network is doing. Seems a lot less complicated.
> 
> I'm also now skeptical that a malicious network couldn't work around
> any of these tricks as long as you remain in their range. If one
> device appears as soon as the other leaves, at the same location, they
> can make a good guess that it's still you.
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