thought this selection from a thread on Cyber-Profs might be of curious interest to
kopimists. I'm with my friend Laura just below that this totally misses the point of
the problem. From a Kopimist perspective, this further demonstrates the gross
misapplication of strong regulatory rules on copying as a means of solving all social
problems through technical proxy rather than dealing with what's so messed up about it
- like intrusion of privacy and obscene defamation.
> From: Laura Quilter <lquilter(a)lquilter.net>
> Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
> Date: April 9, 2013 8:01:06 AM PDT
> To: "cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu" <cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu>
>
> The problem with using copyright on these issues is not that sometimes some victim
will get redress. It is that copyright is not a good fit for the problem. It is
overbroad, so it will allow takedowns of all kinds of materials that are not the ones that
are obviously injurious; it doesn't have the right kinds of corrective actions, to
cover the times when the action isn't the obvious bad action; and it is too narrow to
cover a lot of the folks who need redress cannot get it (those who are nonconsensually
photographed or those who consented to the photography but not the distribution, and joint
authors who want to stop the distribution rather than seek accounting for any profits).
>
> As a matter of development of law, the ability of copyright to be so very broadly
used hinders or at the least does not help us come to a solution that would actually fit
the problem more closely. The more folks use copyright to meet privacy (and other) needs,
the more copyright's purposes & function are distorted. But also, if we are
meeting half the victim's needs with copyright, then half the need for privacy law is
diminished. It's good for those individual claimants, to the extent that their actual
needs are met by a klugey solution, but what about all the others who don't have
recourse to copyright law?
>
> I really like the idea of a narrowly-tailored statute that gets at the harms, at
least for the majority of states that have poorly-developed privacy or IIED torts.
I'm not worried about the First Amendment getting in the way of doing it. There's
nothing in the current law that would prevent the relatively minor extension of First
Amendment exceptions for tort claims by private individuals beyond defamation/false light
to IIED/public disclosure of private facts. And I see no reason why a reasonably
well-drafted and narrowly tailored statute wouldn't survive. At least, I applaud the
legislators for trying; if they get it wrong and we get a well-reasoned decision saying
how & why it's wrong and overbroad, then we can try again.
>
> Trying to cram all the world's ills into copyright law -- although it almost
works, since copyright is so broad! -- is not going to serve either the purposes of
copyright law or the needs of individuals for privacy and autonomy and control over
certain kinds of information about themselves.
>
> To be honest, this seems like the sort of thing that I would like someone to craft
some model legislation on. Why can't those of us concerned about intellectual freedom
*and* privacy rights draft some model legislation? It seems these days that any two-bit
organization with an ideological bent can draft model legislation and get it successfully
passed with the right backing. Maybe some of our fine legal clinics and law professors
could work on this. I'd help.
>
> Laura
>
> ----------------------------------
> Laura Markstein Quilter / lquilter(a)lquilter.net
> Librarian, Geek, Attorney, Teacher
>
>
> Copyright and Information Policy Librarian
> University of Massachusetts, Amherst
> lquilter(a)library.umass.edu
>
> Lecturer, Simmons College, GSLIS
> laura.quilter(a)simmons.edu
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 9:50 AM, Bartow, Ann M. <abartow(a)law.pace.edu> wrote:
> Joint authors cannot sue each other for copyright infringement, so if one joint
author is victimizing the other by distributing a work, copyright law might not have
anything to offer the victim. But at least in the Seventh Circuit one joint author has
standing to sue third parties for copyright infringement, see
http://www.loeb.com/files/Publication/3c77768b-359e-4ec8-8082-69fb241e39f7/…
> But see:
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1393420.html
>
>
> Ann Bartow
> Professor of Law
> Pace Law School
> 78 North Broadway
> White Plains, New York 10603
> (914) 422-4097
> *****************
> Fulbright Scholar '11 - '12
> Tongji University
> Shanghai, People's Republic of China
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:VOLOKH@law.ucla.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2013 9:28 AM
> To: Bartow, Ann M.; cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: RE: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
>
> I was just responding to the "Has anybody suggested otherwise,
Fred?" question.
>
> Also, if the subjects of the revenge porn are joint authors (with the
photographers who then post the material), I would think that this means the subjects may
*not* use copyright law to block distribution of the photographs: As I understand it,
each joint author is allowed to distribute the work on his own say-so, without the
coauthors' permission.
>
> Eugene
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: cyberprof-bounces(a)lists.stanford.edu
[mailto:cyberprof-bounces@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Bartow, Ann M.
> Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2013 6:03 AM
> To: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
>
> Eugene, I am not sure if you are suggesting Rob is wrong about copyright
authorship/ownership, or that Fred thinks Rob is wrong about copyright
authorship/ownership. In any event, a sizeable portion of "revenge porn" is
comprised of videos and photographs taken by victims and shared with their romantic
partners. After the relationships end, the former partners distribute works with the names
and contact information of their copyright holding exes, to humiliate and punish them. I
don't understand why using the notice and take down provisions of the DMCA would be
any less legitimate for these copyright holders than it is for anybody else.
>
> There is also a possibility that subjects of revenge porn could in some circumstances
be considered joint authors, as Derek Bambauer explains here:
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/01/25/beating-revenge-porn-with-…
>
>
> Ann Bartow
> Professor of Law
> Pace Law School
> 78 North Broadway
> White Plains, New York 10603
> (914) 422-4097
> *****************
> Fulbright Scholar '11 - '12
> Tongji University
> Shanghai, People's Republic of China
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:VOLOKH@law.ucla.edu]
> Sent: Monday, April 08, 2013 10:33 PM
> To: Bartow, Ann M.
> Subject: RE: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
>
> I take it that Fred's copyright point was in response to Rob
Heverly's suggestion that, "A useful strategy might be to pursue suits against
these sites under copyright law (where the victim made the photograph/video)and bring
suit for infringement."
>
> Eugene
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: cyberprof-bounces(a)lists.stanford.edu
[mailto:cyberprof-bounces@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Bartow, Ann M.
> Sent: Monday, April 08, 2013 5:22 PM
> To: Fred von Lohmann
> Cc: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
>
> Has anybody suggested otherwise, Fred?
>
> This case highlights the potential impact of copyright law pretty effectively:
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-3445/11-3445-20…
> The photos are not "dumped lover" revenge porn but they are "put an
uppity woman in her place" porn, which perhaps fits within a broad definition of
revenge porn.
>
> And fwiw here is a short article that discusses gaps in the law in the general legal
neighborhood of revenge porn:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2223226/Lindsey-Boyd-sues-Girls-Gon…
>
>
>
>
> Ann Bartow
> Professor of Law
> Pace Law School
> 78 North Broadway
> White Plains, New York 10603
> (914) 422-4097
> *****************
> Fulbright Scholar '11 - '12
> Tongji University
> Shanghai, People's Republic of China
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: Fred von Lohmann [fred(a)vonlohmann.com]
> Sent: Monday, April 8, 2013 7:57 PM
> To: Bartow, Ann M.
> Cc: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
>
> While I have strong feelings about the First Amendment issues here, I will leave that
commentary to those who are much more expert than I am. Just a quick reminder, however, on
the copyright front, that many "revenge porn" situations will be complicated by
questions of authorship. Generally speaking, it is the person taking the photo who holds
the copyright, not the subject of the photo. In those cases, using copyright tools may be
inappropriate (and in some cases under 17 USC 512f, actually actionable).
>
> Fred
>
> On Apr 8, 2013, at 1:46 PM, "Bartow, Ann M." <abartow(a)law.pace.edu>
wrote:
>
> > This is just one (compelling to some of us) example of law
> > interfacing with the complicated feelings people have about bodily
> > autonomy; see also
> >
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2234476
> >
> >
> >
> > Ann Bartow
> > Professor of Law
> > Pace Law School
> > 78 North Broadway
> > White Plains, New York 10603
> > (914) 422-4097
> > *****************
> > Fulbright Scholar '11 - '12
> > Tongji University
> > Shanghai, People's Republic of China
> >
> >
> > From: cyberprof-bounces(a)lists.stanford.edu
> > [mailto:cyberprof-bounces@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Andrew
> > Gilden
> > Sent: Monday, April 08, 2013 4:20 PM
> > To: Neil Richards
> > Cc: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu; Laura Quilter
> > Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
> >
> > Just to add another data point to this discussion, the NJ statute was used
successfully in the prosecution of Dharun Ravi, the Rutgers student who used a webcam to
spy on his roommate Tyler Clementi. Ravi was convicted under the statute based on a
rather broad reading of "sexual contact": Clementi and his friend were seen
shirtless and kissing, for only a few seconds.
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 8, 2013 at 7:56 AM, Neil Richards <nmrichards(a)wulaw.wustl.edu>
wrote:
> > I'm pretty sure that true revenge porn could be (and should be) punished
consistent with the First Amendment, and the Pamela Anderson/Lee case suggests that this
might be true even for celebrities. By "true," I mean the intentional
disclosure of a sex tape or pictures, usually by an ex, for no purpose other than
inflicting harm.
> >
> > I made a similar argument here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1862264, which I am revising for my
forthcoming book on these and related issues (Intellectual Privacy, OUP 2014).
> >
> > I think the law would be on stronger ground if it carved out public figures, and
if it added an element of intentionally intending injury (ie limiting itself to true
revenge porn, which seems analogous to true threats). But I agree with what's been
called the "realist" trend in the thread describing the law in practice.
Especially post-Stevens, the Court has been very unwilling to create new exceptions to the
First Amendment, for many of the reasons Eugene points out. But I think if a true revenge
porn against an ordinary person case came up, even such a "realist" court would
find liability. Even Phelps reserved the question of internet publication of
non-newsworthy facts.
> >
> > Neil
> >
> > Neil M. Richards
> > Professor of Law
> > Washington University in St. Louis
> > One Brookings Drive
> > St. Louis MO 63130
> > (314) 935-4794
> > Fax (314) 935-5356
> >
> > website:
http://law.wustl.edu/faculty/index.asp?id=314
> > ssrn page:
> >
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=400644
> > twitter: @neilmrichards
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From: cyberprof-bounces(a)lists.stanford.edu
> > [mailto:cyberprof-bounces@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Laura
> > Quilter
> > Sent: Monday, April 08, 2013 9:43 AM
> > To: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> >
> > Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
> >
> > I'm not sure why revenge porn per se would be unprotected under the Miller
test for obscenity.
> >
> > Prurient is probably easy; and maybe lacks SLAPS value is not too hard
(especially for the non-Anthony Wiener variety), although I would want to think more about
it.
> >
> > But the middle prong, "depicting or describing ... sexual conduct"
seems like it would not be a good match for a lot of the nude photos that end up on
revenge porn shots, many of which would be still photos and not "sexual
conduct".
> >
> > Just from a common sense approach, the problem is not that these photos are per
se "obscene"; it is that they are non-consensual either in distribution or in
production. That's more like the harms from child porn, which are to the subject
primarily.
> >
> > ----------------------------------
> > Laura Markstein Quilter / lquilter(a)lquilter.net Librarian, Geek,
> > Attorney, Teacher
> >
> >
> > Copyright and Information Policy Librarian University of
> > Massachusetts, Amherst lquilter(a)library.umass.edu
> >
> > Lecturer, Simmons College, GSLIS
> > laura.quilter(a)simmons.edu
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 8, 2013 at 7:59 AM, David Opderbeck <dopderbeck(a)gmail.com>
wrote:
> > I don't know that language of "exception" or "slippage"
is appropriate. Revenge porn is not protected under Miller. That which involves
minors, as much of it does, is unprotected under Ferber.
> >
> >
> > David W. Opderbeck
> > Seton Hall University Law School
> > Professor of Law
> > Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
> > 973.642.8496
> >
> >
> >
> > On Apr 7, 2013, at 10:09 PM, "Volokh, Eugene"
<VOLOKH(a)law.ucla.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Well, that may be what you think. But many people might be
happy to carve out a Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment exception for crimes that they see
as particularly heinous, just as you're happy to carve out a First Amendment exception
(perhaps correctly) in this instance, if they thought that the exception would be kept
sufficiently narrow. What has kept many Justices from carving out such exceptions, I
think, is precisely the worry of slippage to much broader restrictions.
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> > From: David Opderbeck [mailto:dopderbeck@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, April 07, 2013 6:45 PM
> > To: Volokh, Eugene
> > Cc: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> > Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
> >
> > All those examples are already over the hill. Those aren't slippery slope
examples at all.
> >
> > David W. Opderbeck
> > Seton Hall University Law School
> > Professor of Law
> > Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
> > 973.642.8496
> >
> >
> >
> > On Apr 7, 2013, at 7:55 PM, "Volokh, Eugene"
<VOLOKH(a)law.ucla.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Say that someone suggests allowing warrantless searches of people's homes
for child pornography - would we also say "slippery slope arguments don't
persuade [us] at all when we are talking about something so morally heinous as child
porn"? Or allowing compelled self-incrimination in such cases? How about allowing
convictions of the alleged child porn possessor without confrontation of the witnesses
against him? Or perhaps allowing convictions without jury trials in some hate crime
cases, on the theory that bigoted juries might refuse to convict, and the behavior is so
"morally heinous"? Or allowing restrictions on songs that advocate murder of
police officers, on the theory that such songs are also morally heinous, and certainly
counsel extremely heinous behavior?
> >
> > Indeed, slippery slope risks from relaxation of constitutional rights are
especially strong when the case involves "morally heinous" behavior, precisely
because the perceived need to act seems so urgent. And then some years or decades down
the pike, one sees the relaxation of the right expanding to a broader and broader range of
behavior.
> >
> > Again, as I mentioned, I think that limits on the publication of sexually
explicit photos of others might be constitutional. But I think that this should be
considered with serious attention to the risk of slippery slopes, rather than ignoring
this risk because the behavior is so "morally heinous."
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> > From: David Opderbeck [mailto:dopderbeck@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, April 07, 2013 5:48 PM
> > To: Volokh, Eugene
> > Cc: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> > Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
> >
> > Slippery slope arguments don't persuade me at all when we are talking about
something so morally heinous as revenge porn.
> >
> > David W. Opderbeck
> > Seton Hall University Law School
> > Professor of Law
> > Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
> > 973.642.8496
> >
> >
> >
> > On Apr 7, 2013, at 7:38 PM, "Volokh, Eugene"
<VOLOKH(a)law.ucla.edu> wrote:
> >
> > I'm on the record as arguing that limits on the publication
of social security numbers are indeed constitutional, see
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/facilitating.pdf, and that limits on the publication of
sexually explicit photos of others might be constitutional, too,
seehttp://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/privacy.pdf . But the worry about such limits is
precisely how - in a system built on precedent and analogy - such restrictions will become
the foundations for restrictions on other kinds of speech as well, often with little
attempt to cabin those analogies. Arguments that, because limits on the publication of
social security numbers are permissible, limits on the publication of sexually themed
images of others are permissible, too, make me wonder what the next step in the chain of
analogy will be (especially given that this step in the chain seems so large).
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> > From: cyberprof-bounces(a)lists.stanford.edu
> > [mailto:cyberprof-bounces@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf OfDavid
> > Opderbeck
> > Sent: Sunday, April 07, 2013 5:34 PM
> > To: Peter Swire
> > Cc: cyberprof(a)lists.stanford.edu
> > Subject: Re: [CyberProf] "...revenge porn is under siege."
> >
> > From a "realist" perspective you might be right, but from a normative
perspective that values both free speech and privacy, this would not be a good thing.
> >
> > David W. Opderbeck
> > Seton Hall University Law School
> > Professor of Law
> > Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
> > 973.642.8496
> >