2 Mar
2013
2 Mar
'13
12:25 p.m.
Do Robots Have Rights? - I'm planning to submit that as a suggested session
topic for the next Workshop Weekend.
It seems to me that whether or not an autonomous system is a sentient being
seems like a primary hurdle that can't be passed in order to even answer
the question of where responsibility should fall in a way that makes sense
to us. I can't imagine computational entities will ever have the intent we
mean in contemporary society for us to call the damages it causes a crime.
Not only as a matter of the capacities of technical engineering, but even
by definition of what we mean by: (1) act; and (2) intent; and (a-b) what
knowledge is, in the context of both.
As far as I can understand such a question in terms of motive, I think
responsibility should lie with the anticipated capabilities of the
technology created by the programmer(s)/designer(s). Software Malfunction
Liability - we have become convinced that that kind of analysis is too
remote and unfairly misguided. I most definitely agree that it's hard to
say what an engineer should have known, especially if the act was committed
by any further iteration of the program in the autonomous system in the
example. But I think we can get closer to confident about reckless design,
and even grossly negligent design - not to mention unconscionable, which
would make the best case for assigning liability on the designer.
On Sat, Mar 2, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Steve Berl <steveberl(a)gmail.com> wrote:
Seems to me that the autonomous system is guilty of
aiding and abetting a
crime, or conspiracy, or something like that. Either it's a sentient being
and must follow the law, or risk punishment of some sort, or it isn't, and
Bob has to be responsible.
-steve
On Fri, Mar 1, 2013 at 6:54 PM, Anon195714 <anon195714(a)sbcglobal.net>wrote;wrote:
Yo's-
Since I couldn't make it in person...
Hypothetical:
Assume the existence of intelligent computers that can make autonomous
decisions, which many folks believe will become a reality in the near
future.
Alice Analyst publishes virus source code in an online computer security
publication. So far that's clearly protected speech, nobody here would
argue otherwise.
Bob Badguy reads the article and types the code manually into a computer,
with the overt or covert intent for the computer to broadcast the virus and
infect other computers.
Does it matter whether the computer into which Bob enters the virus
source code, is an ordinary computer that does what it's told, vs. an
intelligent computer that has the capacity to make autonomous decisions?
Clearly if the computer is an ordinary one that is not capable of
autonomous decisions, then Bob's typing of the virus code into it would
constitute an "action" rather than "speech," and would not be
protected.
He could be successfully prosecuted for unleashing the virus upon the
world.
But if the computer is an intelligent one that can make autonomous
decisions, then could Bob rightfully claim that his typing of the virus
code into that intelligent computer was _also_ protected speech, merely an
exercise in communication with another sentient being, the same as Alice's
original publication?
-G.
=====
On 13-03-01-Fri 8:22 AM, Eddan Katz wrote:
Dear Kopimists and the People who Love Them.
For the featured Filo delicacy for Friday Filosophy, we will have
potato burekas.
I propose we talk about the difference between source code, object
code, and executable code in regards to 1st Amendment protection. In other
words, when is code speech and when is it a speech-act subject to less
legal protection?
Below is an excerpt from an essay by Lee Tien, a brilliant EFF attorney
for more than a decade, on Software as Speech (2000). These two paragraphs
are in the section: Viruses and other "dangerous" software.
Of course, as always, we can talk about whatever else. Such as
conscience and the unconscionable, perhaps.
Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, Vol. 15 Berkeley Tech.
Law Journal (2000)
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol15/tien/tien.html
Let’s return to the virus
hypothetical.192<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol1…
The
main concern lies in the fact that the software may be “diverted” toward
unlawful purposes, regardless of the speaker’s intent. This concern is,
however, not unique to software. It also applies to other types of
information usable for mischief or harassment, whether highly technical
like information about nuclear weapons, or utterly mundane like a person’s
name, address or telephone number.
Even if the virus author merely posts the source code and fails to
release it in active form, the issue remains whether the posting was done
with an intent to communicate. If the author claims that she intended it to
communicate, we would need to examine the context to decide the
plausibility of that claim. There will often be a plausible claim. There is
no question that people study viruses and other dangerous software in order
to prevent or relieve
harm.193<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol15/tien/t…
One
way to control a virus is to publish its source code so that systems
operators can disable or protect against it. Communicating a virus’ source
code as part of such an effort qualifies as a speech act because the
publisher intends to communicate how the virus works in a conventional way.
In fact, one could imagine entire journals or Internet sites devoted to
viruses and other dangerous
software.194<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol15/ti…
When
such publications aim to alert the world to these dangers, their intent is
clearly communicative.
sent from eddan.com
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-steve