Security Overview

http://does-this-need-to-be-said.tumblr.com/

Social Engineering & Basic Stuff

• doxxing: http://thebot.net/general-tutorials/233339-how-doxing-works-protect-yourself/
• cultivate multiple identities, emails, usernames, etc
• be very wary of facebook, g+, social networks
• always avoid using your legal name, address
• avoid logging in on your phone, or entering your phone #
• you can look up license plates
• "20 questions" metaphor: http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt

Hardware

• cameras, microphones, radios
• facial recognition
• evil chip manufacturers
• keyloggers
• monitors leak radiation
• tracking devices on cars - ride a bicycle, store it indoors
• burner phones - prepaid, kept batteryless
• tin foil houses: http://www.theage.com.au/world/barack-obamas-portable-secrecy-tent-some-assembly-required-20131111-2xb0l.html

Endpoints

• nonfree software (microsoft, apple, google: all evil)
• security updates: package managers are the only way
• app stores add complications: paywalls, "permission creep"
• how exploits work: backdoors, CVEs, black market, foxacid
• hall of shame: skype, silverlight, flash are all evil
• how a computer works
  • picture a vast table of index cards - that is memory, it is addressable
  • CPU instructions manipulate the index cards
  • I/O devices all have addresses you write to/from (registers, ram, disk, net, keyboard, mouse, monitor)
• how an operating system works
  • kernel vs userspace - enforced by CPU
    • kernel runs on a CPU, has access to hardware
    • CPU time is expensive, so how to multitask?
    • kernel invents concept of "users", protects them from each other
    • if user figures out how to mess with the kernel, that's an escalation bug
    • userspace is often called a "shell"
    • trusted boot
      • causing kernel escalation bugs to be taken more seriously
      • when combined with full-disk encryption, prevents "evil maid"
      • sometimes only trusts windows
      • attempts at closing this hole on linux: http://www.outflux.net/blog/archives/2013/12/10/live-patching-the-kernel/
  • super users
    • root on unix, admin on windows
    • privilege separation made windows XP unusable
    • android uses privilege separation - every app is its own user
    • getting super user is also an escalation bug
    • sometimes achieved by keyloggers
    • Xorg / linux desktop ships with its own keylogger (xev)
  • userspace apps are sandboxes
    • interact with images, html, javascript, emails
    • buffer overflows, bad code, bad runtime, bad languages
    • if remote attacker can run code directly on your CPU, that's an execution bug
    • this is how the NSA defeated TBB: bug in firefox xml library
    • execution (get shell) then escalation (get root), optionally get kernel (rootkit) == pwnd
• arms race: who wants to break in?
  • govts, spies
  • vandals - gnaa, syrian electronic army
  • botnets: send spam, mine bitcoin, steal your identity
  • black market for pwnd computers, amazon accounts, etc
  • because exploits are valuable, they use sparingly to avoid discovery
• defense in depth
  • antivirus
    • helps slow mass infections
    • does not protect you personally
    • it's too late, wipe & restore
    • cannot remove all rootkits, kernel exploits, firmware worms
  • firewalls
    • reduce attack surface
    • prevents propagation, phoning home, so no payload for attacker
    • NAT is not security, ipv6 is coming, "internet of things" *shiver*
• developer security
  • source control (git)
  • package signing
  • opsec
  • multiple compiler ecosystems (gcc, llvm/clang)
  • deterministic builds are the future
  • secret backdoors submitted openly (selinux?)

Disk Encryption

• "rubber hose cryptanalysis" https://xkcd.com/538/
• adds security at rest, but not while running
• android makes this easy
• your mugger probably won't dump the RAM, but cops can
• always keep backups - data loss is DoS
• deniability is very hard
• steganography: hiding in plain sight

Networks

• evil
• ISPs spy on you
• assume all cables are tapped, intercepted
• routers & modems are vulnerable
• NSA suppresses openwrt to keep them that way
• closed hardware drivers are the other culprit - patents, binary blobs
  • some things need old kernels: more work for kernel devs
  • #1 reason some hardware needs dd-wrt, not openwrt
• cell phones especially, even with cyanogenmod

Mesh

• harder to wiretap individuals
• but ideally should not be trusted either - end-to-end encryption
• can do location analysis, enable stalkers (seattle)
• mac address randomization: unsupported, not foolproof, easy to block

Tor, VPNs, Proxies

• protect you from your own ISP/network hardware
• provider or exit node still can spy on you
• much VPN software/protocols are not audited
• local traffic analysis & timestamps could give you less deniability
• they can tell WHEN you are using tor/vpn
• tor only hides/obfuscates your IP address - NOTHING ELSE (unless you use tbb)
• flash is evil: poor sandboxing, disrespects proxies

MITM

• anyone controlling the pipes can do it
• Tor can make this WORSE, not better, so router-level Tor is also bad

Crypto

• SSL
  • show example of site that sells SSL certs (namecheap.com)
  • show directory with certs your OS trusts
  • any of these orgs can impersonate any website
  • cert authorities don't solve mitm, just narrows down who can do it
  • US & UK govt: FLYING PIG?
    • french govt http://gigaom.com/2013/12/09/google-catches-french-finance-ministry-pretending-to-be-google/
    • chinese govt https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2013/jan/china-github-and-man-middle
  • bootstrap problem
    • HSTS preloading
    • https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
    • ipsec + dnssec + dane
  • metadata
    • even with SSL, they can see who you're talking to
    • traffic analysis, packet size gives away a lot: google maps tiles, for example
• tor hidden services
  • the address is the certificate
  • solves the mitm problem
  • solves the metadata problem
  • solves the auth problem
  • are not user-friendly by today's standards
  • this is what securedrop uses
• in the future we will all memorize hashes like phone #s
  • similarly: hashed.im
  • OTR approximates this
  • this means that access to truly random numbers is very important
    • specialized crypto hardware
    • PRNGs: android fail
    • freebsd no longer trusts intel http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/we-cannot-trust-intel-and-vias-chip-based-crypto-freebsd-developers-say/

Datamining

Cookies

• ad networks: google, etc
• analytics: google, etc
• CDNs: google, amazon, akamai
• social networks: facebook "like" button, twitter, etc
• session cookies partially solves
  • but how long is your session?
  • what did you do in your session?
• persistence - anything on disk: flash cookies, DOM objects, cache
• deleting flash cookies deletes security settings. flash is evil!
• disk encryption does not solve this - it is still a disk!
• private / incognito mode partially solves, makes false promises
  • bugs, leaks, plugins: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ImportantGoogleChromeBugs
• TAILS solves this - defense in depth

Fingerprinting

• https://panopticlick.eff.org/
• http://browserspy.dk
• https reduces attack surface but does not solve
  • with http you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from EVERYONE EVERYWHERE
  • with https you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from sites you visit & 3rd party networks
• in active use at major sites
  • http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fpdetective/
  • https://github.com/fpdetective/fpdetective/
• worst offenders: javascript, plugins, user agents
• TBB does its best, not perfect
• TAILS mostly solves - but webrtc
• still leaves: your language, timezone (country), window size, timestamps, things you say & do, textual analysis

Other

• referers
• geolocation
• URL shorteners: t.co, bit.ly
• if you're not paying, you're the product