Security Overview
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http://does-this-need-to-be-said.tumblr.com/
Social Engineering & Basic Stuff
- doxxing: http://thebot.net/general-tutorials/233339-how-doxing-works-protect-yourself/
- cultivate multiple identities, emails, usernames, etc
- be very wary of facebook, g+, social networks
- always avoid using your legal name, address
- avoid logging in on your phone, or entering your phone #
- you can look up license plates
- "20 questions" metaphor: http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt
Hardware
- cameras, microphones, radios
- facial recognition
- evil chip manufacturers
- keyloggers
- monitors leak radiation
- tracking devices on cars - ride a bicycle, store it indoors
- burner phones - prepaid, kept batteryless
- tin foil houses: http://www.theage.com.au/world/barack-obamas-portable-secrecy-tent-some-assembly-required-20131111-2xb0l.html
Endpoints
early security: mainframes, protecting users from each other
- how a computer works
- picture a vast table of index cards - that is memory, it is addressable
- CPU instructions manipulate the index cards
- I/O devices all have addresses you write to/from (registers, ram, disk, net, keyboard, mouse, monitor)
- how an operating system works
- kernel vs userspace - enforced by CPU
- kernel runs on a CPU, has access to hardware
- CPU time is expensive, so how to multitask?
- kernel invents concept of "users", protects them from each other
- if user figures out how to mess with the kernel, that's an escalation bug
- userspace is often called a "shell"
- trusted boot
- causing kernel escalation bugs to be taken more seriously
- when combined with full-disk encryption, prevents "evil maid"
- sometimes only trusts windows
- attempts at closing this hole on linux: http://www.outflux.net/blog/archives/2013/12/10/live-patching-the-kernel/
- super users
- root on unix, admin on windows
- privilege separation made windows XP unusable
- android uses privilege separation - every app is its own user
- getting super user is also an escalation bug
- sometimes achieved by keyloggers
- Xorg / linux desktop ships with its own keylogger (xev)
- userspace apps are sandboxes
- interact with images, html, javascript, emails
- buffer overflows, bad code, bad runtime, bad languages
- difference between code & data is arbitrary, enforced by software! this is what makes computers powerful, but is also very dangerous
- if remote attacker can run code directly on your CPU, that's an execution bug
- this is how the NSA defeated TBB: bug in firefox xml library
- execution (get shell) then escalation (get root), optionally get kernel (rootkit) == pwnd
- kernel vs userspace - enforced by CPU
- arms race: who wants to break in?
- govts, spies
- vandals, trolls, syrian electronic army
- botnets: send spam, mine bitcoin, steal your identity
- black market for pwnd computers, amazon accounts, etc
- backdoors, CVEs, foxacid
- because exploits are valuable, they use sparingly to avoid discovery
- updates
- always update!
- package managers are the only way
- app stores add complications: paywalls, "permission creep"
- nonfree software
- microsoft, apple, google: all evil
- hall of shame: skype, silverlight, flash are all evil
- http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-10/21/googles-iron-grip-on-android
- defense in depth
- antivirus
- helps slow mass infections
- does not protect you personally
- it's too late, wipe & restore
- cannot remove all rootkits, kernel exploits, firmware worms
- firewalls
- reduce attack surface
- prevents propagation, phoning home, so no payload for attacker
- NAT is not security, ipv6 is coming, "internet of things" *shiver*
- antivirus
Developer Security
- source control
- secret backdoors submitted openly? https://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux/
- package signing, opsec
- deterministic builds are the future
- https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise
- https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details
- multiple compiler ecosystems (gcc, llvm/clang)
Disk Encryption
- "rubber hose cryptanalysis" https://xkcd.com/538/
- adds security at rest, but not while running
- android makes this easy
- your mugger probably won't dump the RAM, but cops can
- always keep backups - data loss is DoS
- deniability is very hard
- much easier to avoid being a suspect
- having TBB on your disk is a red flag, especially with particular extensions
- ideal solution is steganography: hiding in plain sight
Networks
- evil
- ISPs spy on you
- assume all cables are tapped, intercepted
- routers & modems are vulnerable
- NSA suppresses openwrt to keep them that way
- closed hardware drivers are the other culprit - patents, binary blobs
- some things need old kernels: more work for kernel devs
- #1 reason some hardware needs dd-wrt, not openwrt
- cell phones especially, even with cyanogenmod
Mesh
- harder to wiretap individuals
- but ideally should not be trusted either - end-to-end encryption
- can do location analysis, enable stalkers (seattle)
- mac address randomization: unsupported, not foolproof, easy to block
Tor, VPNs, Proxies
- protect you from your own ISP/network hardware
- provider or exit node still can spy on you
- much VPN software/protocols are not audited
- local traffic analysis & timestamps could give you less deniability
- they can tell WHEN you are using tor/vpn
- tor only hides/obfuscates your IP address - NOTHING ELSE (unless you use tbb)
- flash is evil: poor sandboxing, disrespects proxies
MITM
- anyone controlling the pipes can do it
- Tor can make this WORSE, not better, so router-level Tor is also bad
Crypto
- SSL
- example of site that sells SSL certs: https://www.namecheap.com/ssl-certificates.aspx
- example of who an OS trusts (Arch Linux uses Mozilla's cert list): https://www.archlinux.org/packages/core/any/ca-certificates/
- any of these orgs can impersonate any website
- cert authorities don't solve mitm, just narrows down who can do it
- US & UK govt: FLYING PIG?
- bootstrap problem
- HSTS preloading
- https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
- ipsec + dnssec + dane
- metadata
- even with SSL, they can see who you're talking to
- traffic analysis, packet size gives away a lot: google maps tiles, for example
- tor hidden services
- the address is the certificate
- solves the mitm problem
- solves the metadata problem
- solves the auth problem
- are not user-friendly by today's standards
- this is what securedrop uses
- in the future we will all memorize hashes like phone #s
- similarly: hashed.im
- OTR approximates this
- this means that access to truly random numbers is very important
- specialized crypto hardware
- PRNGs: android fail
- freebsd no longer trusts intel http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/we-cannot-trust-intel-and-vias-chip-based-crypto-freebsd-developers-say/
Datamining
Cookies
- ad networks: google, etc
- analytics: google, etc
- CDNs: google, amazon, akamai
- social networks: facebook "like" button, twitter, etc
- session cookies partially solves
- but how long is your session?
- what did you do in your session?
- persistence - anything on disk: flash cookies, DOM objects, cache
- deleting flash cookies deletes security settings. flash is evil!
- disk encryption does not solve this - it is still a disk!
- private / incognito mode partially solves, makes false promises
- bugs, leaks, plugins: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ImportantGoogleChromeBugs
- TAILS solves this - defense in depth
Fingerprinting
- https://panopticlick.eff.org/
- http://browserspy.dk
- tor bug tracker is always thinking of new problems https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting
- https reduces attack surface but does not solve
- with http you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from EVERYONE EVERYWHERE
- with https you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from sites you visit & 3rd party networks
- in active use at major sites
- worst offenders: javascript, plugins, user agents
- TBB does its best, not perfect
- TAILS mostly solves - but webrtc
- still leaves: your language, timezone (country), window size, timestamps, things you say & do, textual analysis
Other
- referers
- geolocation
- URL shorteners: t.co, bit.ly
- if you're not paying, you're the product