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Difference between revisions of "Mesh/Challenges"
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It is a feature, not a bug. People should use end-to-end encryption with [https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere HTTPS Everywhere] and not relay on security of the network. [[User:Mitar|Mitar]] ([[User talk:Mitar|talk]]) 19:58, 9 August 2013 (PDT) | It is a feature, not a bug. People should use end-to-end encryption with [https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere HTTPS Everywhere] and not relay on security of the network. [[User:Mitar|Mitar]] ([[User talk:Mitar|talk]]) 19:58, 9 August 2013 (PDT) | ||
Hm. Yes, though some questions remain: Are we putting people in a situation where their lack of education about security (no fault of their own) and lack of p2p encryption in their software tools (definitely no fault of their own) will put them at risk? Certainly the risk is no greater than the risk of connecting to any other unknown public wifi access point. However, may people expect a higher level of security from an "official" organization? Second, how can we mitigate the security concerns? I suggest the following approaches: | |||
# Provide instructions on how to create secure tunnels to one of our exit nodes. | |||
# Dedicate some resources to help develop better and easier tools for p2p crypto. | |||
# Provide training for how to use p2p tools, both online and offline. | |||
[[User:Juul|Juul]] ([[User talk:Juul|talk]]) 02:38, 13 August 2013 (PDT) | |||