Difference between revisions of "Security Overview"

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(giant brain dump)
 
(update, partially consolidate)
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http://does-this-need-to-be-said.tumblr.com/
 
http://does-this-need-to-be-said.tumblr.com/
  
social engineering
+
=Social Engineering & Basic Stuff=
 +
 
 
  * doxxing: http://thebot.net/general-tutorials/233339-how-doxing-works-protect-yourself/
 
  * doxxing: http://thebot.net/general-tutorials/233339-how-doxing-works-protect-yourself/
 
  * cultivate multiple identities, emails, usernames, etc
 
  * cultivate multiple identities, emails, usernames, etc
 +
* be very wary of facebook, g+, social networks
 +
* always avoid using your legal name, address
 +
* avoid logging in on your phone, or entering your phone #
 +
* you can look up license plates
 +
* "20 questions" metaphor: http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt
  
hardware
+
=Hardware=
 
  * cameras, microphones, radios
 
  * cameras, microphones, radios
 
  * facial recognition
 
  * facial recognition
Line 12: Line 18:
 
  * monitors leak radiation
 
  * monitors leak radiation
 
  * tracking devices on cars - ride a bicycle, store it indoors
 
  * tracking devices on cars - ride a bicycle, store it indoors
 +
* burner phones - prepaid, kept batteryless
 +
* tin foil houses: http://www.theage.com.au/world/barack-obamas-portable-secrecy-tent-some-assembly-required-20131111-2xb0l.html
  
endpoint operating systems: main problems
+
=Endpoints=
 
  * nonfree software (microsoft, apple, google: all evil)
 
  * nonfree software (microsoft, apple, google: all evil)
 
  * security updates: package managers are the only way
 
  * security updates: package managers are the only way
 
  * app stores add complications: paywalls, "permission creep"
 
  * app stores add complications: paywalls, "permission creep"
 
  * how exploits work: backdoors, CVEs, black market, foxacid
 
  * how exploits work: backdoors, CVEs, black market, foxacid
* execution, escalation, propagation, phoning home
 
* privilege separation (made windows XP unusable)
 
  * on linux this is defeated by keyloggers - X Windows is broken, even ships with its own keylogger (xev)
 
* sandboxing is imperfect (that's how the NSA defeated TBB)
 
 
  * hall of shame: skype, silverlight, flash are all evil
 
  * hall of shame: skype, silverlight, flash are all evil
  * firewalls++
+
  * how a computer works
  * NAT is not security, ipv6 is coming
+
  * picture a vast table of index cards - that is memory, it is addressable
  * virus scanners are an ugly hack. it's too late, wipe & restore
+
  * CPU instructions manipulate the index cards
* rootkits, worms, botnets
+
  * I/O devices all have addresses you write to/from (registers, ram, disk, net, keyboard, mouse, monitor)
* PRNGs: android fail
+
  * how an operating system works
 +
  * kernel vs userspace - enforced by CPU
 +
    * kernel runs on a CPU, has access to hardware
 +
    * CPU time is expensive, so how to multitask?
 +
    * kernel invents concept of "users", protects them from each other
 +
    * if user figures out how to mess with the kernel, that's an escalation bug
 +
    * userspace is often called a "shell"
 +
    * trusted boot
 +
      * causing kernel escalation bugs to be taken more seriously
 +
      * when combined with full-disk encryption, prevents "evil maid"
 +
      * sometimes only trusts windows
 +
      * attempts at closing this hole on linux: http://www.outflux.net/blog/archives/2013/12/10/live-patching-the-kernel/
 +
  * super users
 +
    * root on unix, admin on windows
 +
    * privilege separation made windows XP unusable
 +
    * android uses privilege separation - every app is its own user
 +
    * getting super user is also an escalation bug
 +
    * sometimes achieved by keyloggers
 +
    * Xorg / linux desktop ships with its own keylogger (xev)
 +
  * userspace apps are sandboxes
 +
    * interact with images, html, javascript, emails
 +
    * buffer overflows, bad code, bad runtime, bad languages
 +
    * if remote attacker can run code directly on your CPU, that's an execution bug
 +
    * this is how the NSA defeated TBB: bug in firefox xml library
 +
    * execution (get shell) then escalation (get root), optionally get kernel (rootkit) == pwnd
 +
  * arms race: who wants to break in?
 +
    * govts, spies
 +
    * vandals - gnaa, syrian electronic army
 +
    * botnets: send spam, mine bitcoin, steal your identity
 +
    * black market for pwnd computers, amazon accounts, etc
 +
    * because exploits are valuable, they use sparingly to avoid discovery
 +
* defense in depth
 +
  * antivirus
 +
    * helps slow mass infections
 +
    * does not protect you personally
 +
    * it's too late, wipe & restore
 +
    * cannot remove all rootkits, kernel exploits, firmware worms
 +
  * firewalls
 +
    * reduce attack surface
 +
    * prevents propagation, phoning home, so no payload for attacker
 +
    * NAT is not security, ipv6 is coming, "internet of things" *shiver*
 
  * developer security
 
  * developer security
 
   * source control (git)
 
   * source control (git)
Line 37: Line 81:
  
 
disk encryption
 
disk encryption
  * "rubber hose", "evil maid"
+
  * "rubber hose cryptanalysis" https://xkcd.com/538/
* risky without trusted boot, but trusted boot also broken
 
* deniability is very hard
 
* steganography
 
* best use case: phones (because of controlled environment)
 
 
  * adds security at rest, but not while running
 
  * adds security at rest, but not while running
 +
* android makes this easy
 
  * your mugger probably won't dump the RAM, but cops can
 
  * your mugger probably won't dump the RAM, but cops can
 
  * always keep backups - data loss is DoS
 
  * always keep backups - data loss is DoS
 +
* deniability is very hard
 +
* steganography: hiding in plain sight
 +
 +
=Networks=
  
 
networks are evil
 
networks are evil
Line 74: Line 119:
 
  * anyone controlling the pipes can do it
 
  * anyone controlling the pipes can do it
 
  * Tor can make this WORSE, not better, so router-level Tor is also bad
 
  * Tor can make this WORSE, not better, so router-level Tor is also bad
* SSL
+
 
  * https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
+
=Crypto=
  * cert authorities don't solve mitm, just narrows down who can do it
+
 
  * french ISP spoofed google, so did chinese govt
+
* SSL
  * show directory with certs your OS trusts
+
  * show example of site that sells SSL certs (namecheap.com)
  * show example of site that sells SSL certs (namecheap.com)
+
  * show directory with certs your OS trusts
  * one solution is ipsec + dnssec + dane, but these are not deployed. internet is broken.
+
  * any of these orgs can impersonate any website
* metadata
+
  * cert authorities don't solve mitm, just narrows down who can do it
  * even with SSL, they can see who you're talking to
+
* US & UK govt: FLYING PIG?
  * traffic analysis, packet size gives away a lot: google maps tiles, for example
+
  * french govt http://gigaom.com/2013/12/09/google-catches-french-finance-ministry-pretending-to-be-google/
* tor hidden services
+
  * chinese govt https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2013/jan/china-github-and-man-middle
  * the address is the certificate
+
* bootstrap problem
  * solves the mitm problem
+
  * HSTS preloading
  * solves the metadata problem
+
  * https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
  * solves the auth problem
+
  * ipsec + dnssec + dane
  * are not user-friendly by today's standards
+
* metadata
  * this is what securedrop uses
+
  * even with SSL, they can see who you're talking to
* in the future we will all memorize hashes like phone #s
+
  * traffic analysis, packet size gives away a lot: google maps tiles, for example
  * similarly: hashed.im
+
* tor hidden services
  * OTR approximates this
+
  * the address is the certificate
 +
  * solves the mitm problem
 +
  * solves the metadata problem
 +
  * solves the auth problem
 +
  * are not user-friendly by today's standards
 +
  * this is what securedrop uses
 +
* in the future we will all memorize hashes like phone #s
 +
  * similarly: hashed.im
 +
  * OTR approximates this
 +
  * this means that access to truly random numbers is very important
 +
    * specialized crypto hardware
 +
    * PRNGs: android fail
 +
    * freebsd no longer trusts intel http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/we-cannot-trust-intel-and-vias-chip-based-crypto-freebsd-developers-say/
 +
 
 +
=Datamining=
  
 
cookies
 
cookies
Line 111: Line 170:
  
 
browser fingerprinting
 
browser fingerprinting
 +
* https://panopticlick.eff.org/
 +
* http://browserspy.dk
 
  * https reduces attack surface but does not solve
 
  * https reduces attack surface but does not solve
 
   * with http you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from EVERYONE EVERYWHERE
 
   * with http you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from EVERYONE EVERYWHERE
 
   * with https you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from sites you visit & 3rd party networks
 
   * with https you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from sites you visit & 3rd party networks
 
  * in active use at major sites
 
  * in active use at major sites
 +
  * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fpdetective/
 +
  * https://github.com/fpdetective/fpdetective/
 
  * worst offenders: javascript, plugins, user agents
 
  * worst offenders: javascript, plugins, user agents
 
  * TBB does its best, not perfect
 
  * TBB does its best, not perfect

Revision as of 12:42, 15 December 2013

http://does-this-need-to-be-said.tumblr.com/

Social Engineering & Basic Stuff

* doxxing: http://thebot.net/general-tutorials/233339-how-doxing-works-protect-yourself/
* cultivate multiple identities, emails, usernames, etc
* be very wary of facebook, g+, social networks
* always avoid using your legal name, address
* avoid logging in on your phone, or entering your phone #
* you can look up license plates
* "20 questions" metaphor: http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt

Hardware

* cameras, microphones, radios
* facial recognition
* evil chip manufacturers
* keyloggers
* monitors leak radiation
* tracking devices on cars - ride a bicycle, store it indoors
* burner phones - prepaid, kept batteryless
* tin foil houses: http://www.theage.com.au/world/barack-obamas-portable-secrecy-tent-some-assembly-required-20131111-2xb0l.html

Endpoints

* nonfree software (microsoft, apple, google: all evil)
* security updates: package managers are the only way
* app stores add complications: paywalls, "permission creep"
* how exploits work: backdoors, CVEs, black market, foxacid
* hall of shame: skype, silverlight, flash are all evil
* how a computer works
  * picture a vast table of index cards - that is memory, it is addressable
  * CPU instructions manipulate the index cards
  * I/O devices all have addresses you write to/from (registers, ram, disk, net, keyboard, mouse, monitor)
* how an operating system works
  * kernel vs userspace - enforced by CPU
    * kernel runs on a CPU, has access to hardware
    * CPU time is expensive, so how to multitask?
    * kernel invents concept of "users", protects them from each other
    * if user figures out how to mess with the kernel, that's an escalation bug
    * userspace is often called a "shell"
    * trusted boot
      * causing kernel escalation bugs to be taken more seriously
      * when combined with full-disk encryption, prevents "evil maid"
      * sometimes only trusts windows
      * attempts at closing this hole on linux: http://www.outflux.net/blog/archives/2013/12/10/live-patching-the-kernel/
  * super users
    * root on unix, admin on windows
    * privilege separation made windows XP unusable
    * android uses privilege separation - every app is its own user
    * getting super user is also an escalation bug
    * sometimes achieved by keyloggers
    * Xorg / linux desktop ships with its own keylogger (xev)
  * userspace apps are sandboxes
    * interact with images, html, javascript, emails
    * buffer overflows, bad code, bad runtime, bad languages
    * if remote attacker can run code directly on your CPU, that's an execution bug
    * this is how the NSA defeated TBB: bug in firefox xml library
    * execution (get shell) then escalation (get root), optionally get kernel (rootkit) == pwnd
* arms race: who wants to break in?
    * govts, spies
    * vandals - gnaa, syrian electronic army
    * botnets: send spam, mine bitcoin, steal your identity
    * black market for pwnd computers, amazon accounts, etc
    * because exploits are valuable, they use sparingly to avoid discovery
* defense in depth
  * antivirus
    * helps slow mass infections
    * does not protect you personally
    * it's too late, wipe & restore
    * cannot remove all rootkits, kernel exploits, firmware worms
  * firewalls
    * reduce attack surface
    * prevents propagation, phoning home, so no payload for attacker
    * NAT is not security, ipv6 is coming, "internet of things" *shiver*
* developer security
  * source control (git)
  * package signing
  * opsec
  * multiple compiler ecosystems (gcc, llvm/clang)
  * deterministic builds are the future
  * secret backdoors submitted openly (selinux?)

disk encryption

* "rubber hose cryptanalysis" https://xkcd.com/538/
* adds security at rest, but not while running
* android makes this easy
* your mugger probably won't dump the RAM, but cops can
* always keep backups - data loss is DoS
* deniability is very hard
* steganography: hiding in plain sight

Networks

networks are evil

* ISPs spy on you
* assume all cables are tapped, intercepted
* routers & modems are vulnerable
* NSA suppresses openwrt to keep them that way
* closed hardware drivers are the other culprit - patents, binary blobs
  * some things need old kernels: more work for kernel devs
  * #1 reason some hardware needs dd-wrt, not openwrt
* cell phones especially, even with cyanogenmod

mesh networks

* harder to wiretap individuals
* but ideally should not be trusted either - end-to-end encryption
* can do location analysis, enable stalkers (seattle)
* mac address randomization: unsupported, not foolproof, easy to block

tor, vpns, proxies

* protect you from your own ISP/network hardware
* provider or exit node still can spy on you
* much VPN software/protocols are not audited
* local traffic analysis & timestamps could give you less deniability
* they can tell WHEN you are using tor/vpn
* tor only hides/obfuscates your IP address - NOTHING ELSE (unless you use tbb)
* flash is evil: poor sandboxing, disrespects proxies

mitm

* anyone controlling the pipes can do it
* Tor can make this WORSE, not better, so router-level Tor is also bad

Crypto

  • SSL
 * show example of site that sells SSL certs (namecheap.com)
 * show directory with certs your OS trusts
 * any of these orgs can impersonate any website
 * cert authorities don't solve mitm, just narrows down who can do it
  • US & UK govt: FLYING PIG?
 * french govt http://gigaom.com/2013/12/09/google-catches-french-finance-ministry-pretending-to-be-google/
 * chinese govt https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2013/jan/china-github-and-man-middle
  • bootstrap problem
 * HSTS preloading
 * https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
 * ipsec + dnssec + dane
  • metadata
 * even with SSL, they can see who you're talking to
 * traffic analysis, packet size gives away a lot: google maps tiles, for example
  • tor hidden services
 * the address is the certificate
 * solves the mitm problem
 * solves the metadata problem
 * solves the auth problem
 * are not user-friendly by today's standards
 * this is what securedrop uses
  • in the future we will all memorize hashes like phone #s
 * similarly: hashed.im
 * OTR approximates this
 * this means that access to truly random numbers is very important
   * specialized crypto hardware
   * PRNGs: android fail
   * freebsd no longer trusts intel http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/we-cannot-trust-intel-and-vias-chip-based-crypto-freebsd-developers-say/

Datamining

cookies

* ad networks: google, etc
* analytics: google, etc
* CDNs: google, amazon, akamai
* social networks: facebook "like" button, twitter, etc
* session cookies partially solves
  * but how long is your session?
  * what did you do in your session?
* persistence - anything on disk: flash cookies, DOM objects, cache
* deleting flash cookies deletes security settings. flash is evil!
* disk encryption does not solve this - it is still a disk!
* private / incognito mode partially solves, makes false promises
  * bugs, leaks, plugins: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ImportantGoogleChromeBugs
* TAILS solves this - defense in depth

browser fingerprinting

* https://panopticlick.eff.org/
* http://browserspy.dk
* https reduces attack surface but does not solve
  * with http you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from EVERYONE EVERYWHERE
  * with https you are vulnerable to fingerprinting from sites you visit & 3rd party networks
* in active use at major sites
  * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fpdetective/
  * https://github.com/fpdetective/fpdetective/
* worst offenders: javascript, plugins, user agents
* TBB does its best, not perfect
* TAILS mostly solves - but webrtc
* still leaves: your language, timezone (country), window size, timestamps, things you say & do, textual analysis

other datamining vectors

* referers
* geolocation
* URL shorteners: t.co, bit.ly
* if you're not paying, you're the product