10 Nov
2013
10 Nov
'13
3:50 p.m.
I looked into this awhile ago and it's very easy to change mac addresses.
Kali Linux Tutorials: How to Change or Spoof a MAC Address
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JyP8aGtPZpA
On Sun, Nov 10, 2013 at 3:03 PM, <mesh-request(a)lists.sudoroom.org> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Fwd: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh network for
surveillance? (rhodey)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 10 Nov 2013 15:03:01 -0800
From: rhodey <rhodey(a)anhonesteffort.org>
To: mesh(a)lists.sudoroom.org
Subject: Re: [Mesh] Fwd: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh
network for surveillance?
Message-ID: <528010A5.8030704(a)anhonesteffort.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Police, govt, and other evil adversaries are free to setup their own
hardware, their own mesh, the idea is not to prevent this but to prevent
the use of good mesh networks for evil. I want to give more thought to
this subject sometime in the near future but for now this is what I have...
The major concern here (as I see it) is the persistence of MAC
addresses. The average user does not know how to change their MAC
address and in the case of most mobile devices it is not possible to
change the MAC address. We can ensure that IP addresses are cycled
frequent enough because we'll have control over a majority of the DHCP
servers on the mesh so I'll be focusing on MAC addresses.
In any local network a MAC address can be associated with network
traffic, the obvious solution here is to use encryption. The problem
with MAC addresses in a mesh network is that they could also be
associated with a location.
On any layer 2 network it is possible for any connected host to
determine the route to any other host using a MAC address as an
identifier. Because mesh nodes have a fixed (and likely known) physical
location it can be assumed that the last hop in the route corresponds to
the physical location of the specific host.
It is important to realize that only mesh nodes (access points) have
*potential* knowledge of signal strength and other 802.11 broadcast type
frames-- sure Oakland PD can setup a device to listen to all 802.11
traffic, but remember we're only focusing on how existing hardware can
be abused. So, one host *cannot* triangulate the location of another
host. *From the perspective of a host on the mesh, a host can only be
connected to one mesh node or disconnected from the network.* In the
context of physical location, the privacy of a host on the mesh is a
function of the area covered by the mesh node it is connected to.
To increase user privacy I would like to experiment with a MAC address
spoofing service that could run on mesh nodes or volunteer hosts. The
service would basically pretend to be just another host on the network
identified by some MAC address. The service could intelligently spawn
fake hosts depending on the number of other hosts connected to the
shared mesh node. Mesh nodes with fewer connected hosts need more
spoofed hosts to increase privacy, etc. But it is not that simple of
course, because spoofed MAC addresses need to persist just as legitimate
MAC addresses do, and move about in the physical world (connect to
different mesh nodes) just as other legitimate users will. I've thought
some of this through but it is a large undertaking that needs further
planning.
Another thing to keep in mind is that although MAC addresses could be
used as a persistent identifier *they alone do not represent any
identity.* It is not until an adversary obtains additional information
that a MAC address could be used to identify an individual person. Not
to say the surveillance of pseudo-anonymous individual and group
movement is negligible, just pointing this out.
In conclusion (for now) by keeping our software and build processes open
we can convince reasonable users that it is not possible for us to track
them with more than neighborhood level accuracy. If we go further and
deploy something like the MAC spoofing service it could be possible to
extend this guarantee further. I think it is also likely that this MAC
spoofing service could be designed to prevent/degrade 802.11 style
surveillance by hardware outside our control.
--
-- rhodey ?????
On 11/10/2013 11:44 AM, Steve Berl wrote:
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/you-are-a-rogue-device/Content?oid=18143…
> --
> Preston Rhea
> Field Analyst, Open Technology Institute
> New America Foundation
> +1-202-570-9770 <tel:%2B1-202-570-9770>
> Twitter: @prestonrhea
> --
> -steve
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> mesh mailing list
> mesh(a)lists.sudoroom.org
> http://lists.sudoroom.org/listinfo/mesh
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End of mesh Digest, Vol 10, Issue 16
************************************
Couldn't a community mesh network be
suspected of having the same sort
of tracking abilities?
How do we convince potential mesh network users that we aren't
collecting location data on them?
Steve
On Friday, November 8, 2013, Jenny Ryan wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: *Preston Rhea* <prestonrhea(a)opentechinstitute.org
<javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
'prestonrhea(a)opentechinstitute.org');>>
Date: Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 6:49 AM
Subject: Fwd: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh network for
surveillance?
To: Jenny Ryan <jenny(a)thepyre.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
'jenny(a)thepyre.org');>>#39;);>>, Shaun Houlihan <shaunhoulihan(a)gmail.com
<javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'shaunhoulihan(a)gmail.com');>>
Thought this would interest y'all, I don't know if you are already on
the Commotion listserv Jenny.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Dan Staples <danstaples(a)opentechinstitute.org
<javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
'danstaples(a)opentechinstitute.org');>>
Date: Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 9:32 PM
Subject: [Commotion-discuss] Seattle Police mesh network for
surveillance?
To: commotion-discuss <commotion-discuss(a)lists.chambana.net
<javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'commotion-discuss(a)lists.chambana.net
');>>
You Are a Rogue Device
A New Apparatus Capable of Spying on You Has Been Installed
Throughout
Downtown Seattle. Very Few Citizens Know What
It Is, and Officials
Don?t
Want to Talk About It.
by Matt Fikse-Verkerk and Brendan Kiley
If you're walking around downtown Seattle, look up: You'll see
off-white
boxes, each one about a foot tall with
vertical antennae, attached to
utility poles. If you're walking around downtown while looking at a
smartphone, you will probably see at least one?and more likely two or
three?Wi-Fi networks named after intersections: "4th&Seneca,"
"4th&Union," "4th&University," and so on. That is how you
can see the
Seattle Police Department's new wireless mesh network, bought from a
California-based company called Aruba Networks, whose clients include
the Department of Defense, school districts in Canada, oil-mining
interests in China, and telecommunications companies in Saudi Arabia.
The question is: How well can this mesh network see you?
How accurately can it geo-locate and track the movements of your
phone,
laptop, or any other wireless device by its
MAC address (its "media
access control address"?nothing to do with Macintosh?which is
analogous
to a device's thumbprint)? Can the
network send that information to a
database, allowing the SPD to reconstruct who was where at any given
time, on any given day, without a warrant? Can the network see you
now?
The SPD declined to answer more than a dozen questions from The
Stranger, including whether the network is operational, who has
access
to its data, what it might be used for, and
whether the SPD has used
it
(or intends to use it) to geo-locate
people's devices via their MAC
addresses or other identifiers.
Seattle Police detective Monty Moss, one of the leaders of the
mesh-network project?one part of a $2.7 million effort, paid for by
the
Department of Homeland Security?wrote in an
e-mail that the
department
"is not comfortable answering policy
questions when we do not yet
have a
policy." But, Detective Moss added, the
SPD "is actively
collaborating
with the mayor's office, city council,
law department, and the ACLU
on a
use policy." The ACLU, at least, begs to
differ: "Actively
collaborating" is not how they would put it. Jamela Debelak,
technology
and liberty director of the Seattle office,
says the ACLU submitted
policy-use suggestions months ago and has been waiting for a
response.
Detective Moss also added that the mesh network would not be used for
"surveillance purposes... without City Council's approval and the
appropriate court authorization." Note that he didn't say the mesh
network couldn't be used for the surveillance functions we asked
about,
only that it wouldn't?at least until
certain people in power say it
can.
That's the equivalent of a "trust
us" and a handshake.
His answer is inadequate for other reasons as well. First, the city
council passed an ordinance earlier this year stating that any
potential
surveillance equipment must submit protocols
to the city council for
public review and approval within 30 days of its acquisition and
implementation. This mesh network has been around longer than that,
as
confirmed by Cascade Networks, Inc., which
helped install it. Still,
the
SPD says it doesn't have a policy for its
use yet. Mayor McGinn's
office
says it expects to see draft protocols
sometime in December?nearly
nine
months late, according to the new ordinance.
Second, and more importantly, this mesh network is part of a whole
new
arsenal of surveillance technologies that are
moving faster than the
laws that govern them are being written. As Stephanie K. Pell (former
counsel to the House Judiciary Committee) and Christopher Soghoian
(senior policy analyst at the ACLU) wrote in a 2012 essay for the
Berkeley Technology Law Journal:
The use of location information by law enforcement agencies is
common and becoming more so as technological improvements enable
collection of more accurate and precise location data. The legal
mystery
surrounding the proper law enforcement access
standard for
prospective
location data remains unsolved. This mystery,
along with conflicting
rulings over the appropriate law enforcement access standards for
both
prospective and historical location data, has
created a messy,
inconsistent legal landscape where even judges in the same district
may
require law enforcement to meet different
standards to compel
location
data.
In other words, law enforcement has new tools?powerful tools. We
didn't
ask for them, but they're here. And
nobody knows the rules for how
they
should be used.
This isn't the first time the SPD has purchased surveillance
equipment
(or, as they might put it, public-safety
equipment that happens to
have
powerful surveillance capabilities) without
telling the rest of the
city. There was the drones controversy this past winter, when the
public
and elected officials discovered that the SPD
had bought two unmanned
aerial vehicles with the capacity to spy on citizens. There was an
uproar, and a few SPD officers embarked on a mea culpa tour of
community
meetings where they answered questions and
endured (sometimes
raucous)
criticism. In February, Mayor Mike McGinn
announced he was grounding
the
drones, but a new mayor could change his
mind. Those SPD drones are
sitting somewhere right now on SPD property.
Meanwhile, the SPD was also dealing with the port-camera surveillance
scandal. That kicked off in late January, when people in West Seattle
began wondering aloud about the 30 cameras that had appeared
unannounced
on utility poles along the waterfront. The
West Seattle neighborhood
blog (westseattleblog.com <http://westseattleblog.com>) sent
questions to city utility companies, and
the utilities in turn pointed at SPD, which eventually admitted that
it
had purchased and installed 30 surveillance
cameras with federal
money
for "port security." That resulted
in an additional uproar and
another
mea culpa tour, much like they did with the
drones, during which
officers repeated that they should have done a better job of
educating
the public about what they were up to with
the cameras on Alki.
(Strangely, the Port of Seattle and the US Coast Guard didn't seem
very
involved in this "port security"
project?their names only appear in a
few cursory places in the budgets and contracts. The SPD is clearly
the
driving agency behind the project. For
example, their early tests of
sample Aruba products?beginning with a temporary Aruba mesh network
set
up in Pioneer Square for Mardi Gras in
2009?didn't have anything to
do
with the port whatsoever.)
The cameras attracted the controversy, but they were only part of the
project. In fact, the 30 pole-mounted cameras on Alki that caused the
uproar cost $82,682?just 3 percent of the project's $2.7 million
Homeland Security?funded budget. The project's full title was "port
security video surveillance system with wireless mesh network."
People
raised a fuss about the cameras. But what
about the mesh network?
Detective Moss and Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh mentioned the
downtown
mesh network during those surveillance-camera
community meetings,
saying
it would help cops and firefighters talk to
each other by providing a
wireless network for their exclusive use, with the potential for
others
to use overlaid networks handled by the same
equipment. (Two-way
radios
already allow police officers to talk to each
other, but officers
still
use wireless networks to access data, such as
the information an
officer
looks for by running your license plate
number when you've been
pulled
over.)
As Brian Magnuson of Cascade Networks, Inc., which helped install the
Aruba system, explained the possible use of such a system: "A normal
cell-phone network is a beautiful thing right up until the time you
really need it?say you've just had an earthquake or a large storm,
and
then what happens? Everybody picks up their
phone and overloads the
system." The network is most vulnerable precisely when it's most
needed.
A mesh network could be a powerful tool for
streaming video from
surveillance cameras or squad car dash-cams across the network,
allowing
officers "real-time situational
awareness" even when other
communication
systems have been overloaded, as Detective
Moss explained in those
community meetings.
But the Aruba mesh network is not just for talking, it's also for
tracking.
After reviewing Aruba's technical literature, as well as talking to
IT
directors and systems administrators around
the country who work with
Aruba products, it's clear that their networks are adept at seeing
all
the devices that move through their coverage
area and visually
mapping
the locations of those devices in real time
for the system
administrators' convenience. In fact, one of Aruba's major selling
points is its ability to locate "rogue" or "unassociated"
devices?that
is, any device that hasn't been
authorized by (and maybe hasn't even
asked to be part of) the network.
Which is to say, your device. The cell phone in your pocket, for
instance.
The user's guide for one of Aruba's recent software products states:
"The wireless network has a wealth of information about unassociated
and
associated devices." That software
includes "a location engine that
calculates associated and unassociated device location every 30
seconds
by default... The last 1,000 historical
locations are stored for each
MAC address."
For now, Seattle's mesh network is concentrated in the downtown area.
But the SPD has indicated in PowerPoint presentations?also acquired
by
The Stranger?that it hopes to eventually have
"citywide deployment"
of
the system that, again, has potential
surveillance capabilities that
the
SPD declined to answer questions about. That
could give a whole new
meaning to the phrase "real-time situational awareness."
So how does Aruba's mesh network actually function?
Each of those off-white boxes you see downtown is a wireless access
point (AP) with four radios inside it that work to shove giant
amounts
of data to, through, and around the network,
easily handling
bandwidth-hog uses such as sending live, high-resolution video to or
from moving vehicles. Because this grid of APs forms a latticelike
mesh,
it works like the internet itself, routing
traffic around bottlenecks
and "self-healing" by sending traffic around components that fail.
As Brian Magnuson at Cascade Networks explains: "When you have 10
people
talking to an AP, no problem. If you have 50,
that's a problem."
Aruba's
mesh solution is innovative?instead of
building a few high-powered,
herculean APs designed to withstand an immense amount of traffic,
Aruba
sprinkles a broad area with lots of
lower-powered APs and lets them
figure out the best way to route all the data by talking to each
other.
Aruba's technology is considered cutting-edge because its systems are
easy to roll out, administer, and integrate with other systems, and
its
operating system visualizes what's
happening on the network in a
simple,
user-friendly digital map. The company is one
of many firms in the
networking business, but, according to the tech-ranking firm Gartner,
Aruba ranks second (just behind Cisco) in "completeness of vision"
and
third in "ability to execute" for
its clever ways of getting around
technical hurdles.
Take Candlestick Park, the San Francisco 49ers football stadium,
which,
Magnuson says, is just finishing up an Aruba
mesh network
installation.
The stadium has high-intensity cellular
service needs?70,000 people
can
converge there for a single event in one of
the most high-tech
cities in
America, full of high-powered, newfangled
devices. "Aruba's solution
was
ingenious," Magnuson says. It put 640
low-power APs under the
stadium's
seats to diffuse the data load. "If
you're at the stadium and trying
to
talk to an AP," Magnuson says,
"you're probably sitting on it!"
Another one of Aruba's selling points is its ability to detect rogue
devices?strangers to the system. Its promotional "case studies"
trumpet
this capability, including one report about
Cabela's hunting and
sporting goods chain, which is an Aruba client: "Because Cabela's
stores
are in central shopping areas, the company
captures huge quantities
of
rogue data?as many as 20,000 events per day,
mostly from neighboring
businesses." Aruba's network is identifying and distinguishing which
devices are allowed on the Cabela's network and which are within the
coverage area but are just passing through. The case study also
describes how Cabela's Aruba network was able to locate a lost
price-scanner gun in a large warehouse by mapping its location, as
well
as track employees by the devices they were
carrying.
It's one thing for a privately owned company to register devices it
already owns with a network. It's another for a local police
department
to scale up that technology to blanket an
entire downtown?or an
entire city.
Aruba also sells a software product called "Analytics and Location
Engine 1.0." According to a document Aruba has created about the
product, ALE "calculates the location of associated and unassociated
wifi devices... even though a device has not associated to the
network,
information about it is available. This
includes the MAC address,
location, and RSSI information." ALE's default setting is anonymous,
which "allows for unique user tracking without knowing who the
individual user is." But, Aruba adds in the next sentence,
"optionally
the anonymization can be disabled for richer
analytics and user
behavior
tracking." The network has the ability
to see who you are?how deeply
it
looks is up to whoever's using it. (The
Aruba technology, as far as
we
know, does not automatically associate a
given MAC address with the
name
on the device's account. But figuring out
who owns the account?by
asking
a cell-phone company, for example?would not
be difficult for a
law-enforcement agency.)
Geo-location seems to be an area of intense interest for Aruba. Last
week, the Oregonian announced that Aruba had purchased a Portland
mapping startup called Meridian, which, according to the article, has
developed software that "pinpoints a smartphone's location inside a
venue, relying either on GPS technology or with localized wireless
networks." The technology, the article says, "helps people find their
way within large buildings, such as malls, stadiums, or airports and
enables marketing directed at a phone's precise location."
How does that geo-location work? Devices in the network's coverage
area
are "heard" by more than one radio
in those APs (the off-white
boxes).
Once the network hears a device from multiple
APs, it can compare the
strength and timing of the signal to locate where the device is.
This is
classic triangulation, and users of
Aruba's AirWave software?as in
the
Cabela's example?report that their
systems are able to locate
devices to
within a few feet.
In the case of large, outdoor installations where APs are more spread
out, the ability to know what devices are passing through is
useful?especially, perhaps, to policing agencies, which could log
that
data for long-term storage. As networking
products and their uses
continue to evolve, they will only compound the "legal mystery"
around
how this technology could and should be used
that Pell and Soghoian
described in their Berkeley Technology Law Journal piece. Aruba's
mesh
network is state-of-the-art, but something
significantly smarter and
more sensitive will surely be on the market this time next year. And
who
knows how much better the software will get.
An official spokesperson for Aruba wrote in an e-mail that the
company
could not answer The Stranger's questions
because they pertained "to
a
new product announcement" that would not
happen until Thanksgiving.
"Aruba's technology," the spokesperson added, "is designed for
indoor
(not outdoor) usage and is for consumer apps where they opt in."
This is
in direct contradiction to Aruba's own
user's manuals, as well as the
fact that the Seattle Police Department installed an outdoor Aruba
mesh
network earlier this year.
One engineer familiar with Aruba products and similar systems?who
requested anonymity?confirmed that the mesh network and its software
are
powerful tools. "But like
anything," the engineer said, it "can be
used
inappropriately... You can easily see how a
user might abuse this
ability (network admin has a crush on user X, monitors user X's
location
specifically)." As was widely reported
earlier this year, such
alleged
abuses within the NSA have included a man who
spied on nine women
over a
five-year period, a woman who spied on
prospective boyfriends, a man
who
spied on his girlfriend, a husband who spied
on his wife, and even a
man
who spied on his ex-girlfriend "on his
first day of access to the
NSA's
surveillance system," according to the
Washington Post. The practice
was
so common within the NSA, it got its own
classification: "LOVEINT."
Other Aruba clients?such as a university IT director, a university
vice
president, and systems administrators?around
the country confirmed it
wouldn't be difficult to use the mesh network to track the movement
of
devices by their MAC addresses, and that
building a historical
database
of their movements would be relatively
trivial from a data-storage
perspective.
As Bruce Burton, an information technology manager at the University
of
Cincinnati (which uses an Aruba network), put
it in an e-mail: "This
mesh network will have the capability to track devices (MAC
addresses)
throughout the city."
Not that the SPD would do that?but we don't know. "We definitely feel
like the public doesn't have a handle on what the capabilities are,"
says Debelak of the ACLU. "We're not even sure the police department
does." It all depends on what the SPD says when it releases its
mesh-network protocols.
"They're long overdue," says Lee Colleton, a systems administrator at
Google who is also a member of the Seattle Privacy Coalition, a
grassroots group that formed in response to SPD's drone and
surveillance-camera controversies. "If we don't deal with this kind
of
thing now, and establish norms and policies,
we'll find ourselves in
an
unpleasant situation down the road that will
be harder to change."
The city is already full of surveillance equipment. The Seattle
Department of Transportation, for example, uses license-plate
scanners,
sensors embedded in the pavement, and other
mechanisms to monitor
individual vehicles and help estimate traffic volume and wait time.
"But
as soon as that data is extrapolated,"
says Adiam Emery of SDOT,
"it's
gone." They couldn't turn it over to
a judge if they tried.
Not that license-plate scanners have always been so reliable. Doug
Honig
of the ACLU remembers a story he heard from a
former staffer a
couple of
years ago about automatic license-plate
readers on police cars in
Spokane. Automatic license-plate readers "will read a chain-link
fence
as XXXXX," Honig says, "which at
the time also matched the license
plate
of a stolen car in Mississippi, resulting in
a number of false
alerts to
pull over the fence."
Seattle's mesh network is only one instance in a trend of Homeland
Security funding domestic surveillance equipment. Earlier this month,
the New York Times ran a story about a $7 million Homeland Security
grant earmarked for "port security"?just like the SPD's mesh-network
funding?in Oakland.
"But instead," the Times reports, "the money is going to a police
initiative that will collect and analyze reams of surveillance data
from
around town?from gunshot- detection sensors
in the barrios of East
Oakland to license plate readers mounted on police cars patrolling
the
city's upscale hills."
The Oakland "port security" project, which the Times reports was
formerly known as the "Domain Awareness Center," will "electronically
gather data around the clock from a variety of sensors and databases,
analyze that data, and display some of the information on a bank of
giant monitors." The Times doesn't detail what kind of "sensors and
databases" the federally funded "port security" project will pay for,
but perhaps it's something like Seattle's mesh network with its
ability
to ping, log, and visually map the movement
of devices in and out of
its
coverage area.
Which brings up some corollary issues, ones with implications much
larger than the SPD's ability to call up a given time on a given day
and
see whether you were at work, at home, at
someone's else home, at a
bar,
or at a political demonstration: What does it
mean when money from a
federal agency like the Department of Homeland Security is being
funneled to local police departments like SPD to purchase and use
high-powered surveillance gear?
For federal surveillance projects, the NSA and other federal spying
organizations have at least some oversight?as flawed as it may
be?from
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(also known as the FISA
court) and the US Congress. But local law enforcement doesn't have
that
kind of oversight and, in Seattle at least,
has been buying and
installing DHS-funded surveillance equipment without explaining what
it's up to. The city council's surveillance ordinance earlier this
year
was an attempt to provide local oversight on
that kind of policing,
but
it has proven toothless.
It's reasonable to assume that locally gleaned information will be
shared with other organizations, including federal ones. An SPD
diagram
of the mesh network, for example, shows its
information heading to
institutions large and small, including the King County Sheriff's
Office, the US Coast Guard, and our local fusion center.
Fusion centers, if you're unfamiliar with the term, are
information-sharing hubs, defined by the Department of Homeland
Security
as "focal points" for the
"receipt, analysis, gathering, and
sharing" of
surveillance information.
If federally funded, locally built surveillance systems with little
to
no oversight can dump their information in a
fusion center?think of
it
as a gun show for surveillance, where
agencies freely swap
information
with little restriction or oversight?that
could allow federal
agencies
such as the FBI and the NSA to do an end-run
around any limitations
set
by Congress or the FISA court.
If that's their strategy in Seattle, Oakland, and elsewhere, it's an
ingenious one?instead of maintaining a few high-powered, herculean
surveillance agencies designed to digest an immense amount of traffic
and political scrutiny, the federal government could sprinkle an
entire
nation with lots of low-powered surveillance
nodes and let them
figure
> out the best way to route the data by talking to each other. By
> diffusing the way the information flows, they can make it flow more
> efficiently.
>
> It's an innovative solution?much like the Aruba mesh network itself.
>
> The Department of Homeland Security has not responded to requests for
> comment.
>
> --
> Dan Staples
>
> Open Technology Institute
> https://commotionwireless.net
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