On Dec 28, 2013, at 8:37 PM, aestetix
<aestetix(a)aestetix.com> wrote:
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Hash: SHA1
FWIW, they will be doing an outreach to constituents sometime in
January to discuss privacy concerns. I'm apparently on the list,
unsure what that means. If I hear anything more I'll let everyone know.
Cheers,
aestetix
PS: greetings from Germany!
On 12/29/13 4:46 AM,
eddan.com wrote:
Included below is the East Bay Express' unbelievable exposé on the
Domain Awareness Center being built in Oakland. While it is
extraordinarily shocking what the plans are, it is within the
dystopia scope of what civil rights advocates have been concerned
about. But I think it is also amazingly shocking how much has been
exposed and documented about it already.
These developments require a powerful response and should be a top
priority for awareness raising in 2014. Not just protests, but
serious and thoughtful articulation of the profound implications of
this turning point of freedom in this country and specifically this
city.
http://m.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/the-real-purpose-of-oaklands-surveillan…
The Real Purpose of Oakland's Surveillance Center
City leaders have argued that Oakland needs a massive surveillance
system to combat violent crime, but internal documents reveal that
city staffers are also focused on tracking political protesters. by
Darwin BondGraham and Ali Winston| December 18, 2013
Oakland's citywide surveillance system, the Domain Awareness
Center, or DAC, gained national notoriety earlier this year when
some city residents voiced strong concerns about the project's
privacy and civil rights implications. City officials and
supporters of the DAC have responded by contending that objections
over privacy and civil rights issues are overblown and that the
true purpose of the surveillance center is to help Oakland finally
deal with its violent crime problem. But thousands of pages of
emails, meeting minutes, and other public documents show that,
behind closed doors, city staffers have not been focusing on how
the DAC can lower Oakland's violent crime rate.
So what is the real purpose of the massive $10.9 million
surveillance system? The records we examined show that the DAC is
an open-ended project that would create a surveillance system that
could watch the entire city and is designed to easily incorporate
new high-tech features in the future. And one of the uses that has
piqued the interest of city staffers is the deployment of the DAC
to track political protesters and monitor large demonstrations.
Linda Lye, a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union
of Northern California, was alarmed when we showed her emails that
revealed that the Oakland Police Department has already started
using the DAC to keep tabs on people engaged in First Amendment
activity. "The fact that the focus so far has been on political
protests, rather than the violent crime that's impacting Oakland
residents, is troubling, and telling about how the city plans to
use the DAC," she said.
"Information is always fundamentally about control," she added.
Once it's fully operational, the DAC will give Oakland officials an
unprecedented ability to monitor peoples' movements, associations,
and activities.
The Domain Awareness Center is being built in stages and will merge
OPD's existing license-plate scanners and gunshot detectors with
video feeds from hundreds of surveillance cameras ? many already in
place and some to be installed in the future by several different
agencies throughout the city ? into a central hub. Oakland police
will monitor this "flood of data," as one DAC project presentation
called it. Originally limited to monitoring the Port of Oakland,
the DAC has since expanded to encompass the entire city.
The Oakland Privacy Working Group, an activist coalition opposed to
the DAC, obtained thousands of pages of emails and other public
records related to the project from the city via a California
Public Records Act request. The privacy group then shared the
documents ? which cover the period from August 2012 through
September 2013 ? with us.
While the emails reveal a great deal about the DAC, they are also
notable for what they do not talk about. Among the hundreds of
messages sent and received by Oakland staffers and the city's
contractor team responsible for building the DAC, there is no
mention of robberies, shootings, or the 138 homicides that took
place during the period of time covered by the records. City
staffers do not discuss any studies pertaining to the use of
surveillance cameras in combating crime, nor do they discuss how
the Domain Awareness System could help OPD with its longstanding
problems with solving violent crimes. In more than 3,000 pages of
emails, the terms "murder," "homicide," "assault,"
"robbery," and
"theft" are never mentioned.
The records also show that the Oakland City Council's attempt to
rein in the features of the DAC that pose the most serious threats
to civil liberties, and to craft a privacy and data retention
policy, may be too little, too late. City staffers have apparently
found a way to work around the intended policies of the council.
Moreover, the documents reveal that, behind the scenes, the Oakland
Police Department, despite its long and troubling record of
violating people's civil rights, is in charge of designing the DAC
and the policies that will govern its use.
Furthermore, records show that the DAC already has so-called "video
analytic" capabilities. Video analytics include features like
automated vehicle and pedestrian tracking, motion recognition, and
a "virtual fence" that determines when people approach or attempt
to breach fences surrounding Port of Oakland property. The
documents also reveal that the DAC contractor, SAIC, now called
Leidos Holdings, Inc., over-billed the City of Oakland by upwards
of $160,000 by purchasing expensive software and gadgets that SAIC
staff kept for themselves, and by filing invoices for work that
wasn't done. Several Oakland staffers caught this and deducted the
charges, but only after forcing SAIC to exhaustively account for
labor, tools, and $94,000 in goods received for which there were no
receipts provided.
It's unclear just how much of Oakland will be put under continuous,
pervasive surveillance by OPD with the DAC, but internal city
records show that plans to incorporate cameras inside Oakland's
public schools and Oakland Housing Authority properties are very
much alive. So, too, are plans to feed in surveillance footage from
hundreds of other cameras already in place around the city through
OPD's commercial camera lending program, local transit agencies,
and a planned surveillance system the Downtown Oakland Association
and the Lake Merritt Uptown District Association business
improvement districts intend to build.
And cameras are just the beginning: Documents mention monitoring
"social media," "web feeds," and "text messaging."
Large surveillance centers are becoming increasingly common
nationwide: They now exist in New York City; Chicago; Baltimore;
Washington, DC; and Hudson County, New Jersey. Political leaders
typically contend that such centers are necessary to combat
terrorist threats and reduce crime.
But Rajiv Shah, a professor of communication at the University of
Illinois-Chicago who conducted a study on the efficacy of Chicago
police's crime cameras, said surveillance systems aren't guaranteed
to help police reduce crime. They do, however, serve political
goals of looking tough on crime.
In Chicago, the camera network was set up during the mid-2000s with
no public input or oversight. And local officials justified it by
pointing to the dual threats of terrorism and crime. But the
latter, Shah said, is a red herring. "It's not really about solving
crime," he said. "That's just something that's tacked on at the end
to make it easier for the public to swallow." From a political
perspective, he said, the questionable efficacy of networking
cameras comes in second to the political currency of claiming
credit for a brick-and-mortar project geared toward fighting
violent crime. "It's like every local politician: 'I'll do
something to create more jobs. I'll do something to reduce crime.
I'll set up a camera system.'"
In Oakland, city leaders have also pointed to the city's high crime
rate as the primary reason for building a surveillance center.
Supporters of the DAC have also argued that the possibility of
infringing on people's privacy or civil rights pales in comparison
to the need to address violence in the city. "There are so many
people in West Oakland who feel terrorized by gunplay and
prostitution, gangs or just straight violence," said Councilmember
Lynette Gibson McElhaney, whose district encompasses downtown and
West Oakland.
There are a large number of residents in Oakland ? poor, rich,
black, white, Latino, and Asian ? who desperately want something to
be done about the violent crime that has taken thousands of mostly
young African-American and Latino men to the grave over the past
thirty years, and McElhaney said these communities support
surveillance cameras.
But it's unclear whether residents understand how the DAC is going
to be used. Civil rights attorney Jim Chanin, an Oakland resident
who has been an integral part of the team involved in federal
oversight of OPD for the past decade, said he's concerned about the
police department's track record of misconduct and its history of
disproportionately targeting people of color. "Under the right
circumstances, [the DAC] could solve some crime, and help deter bad
behavior by police, since they're still not using their [chest
mounted cameras] properly," Chanin said. "However, if done wrong,
the surveillance center will be a titanic waste of money. It will
invade people's privacy and become a bureaucratic nightmare from
managing so much data.
"There are fundamental problems with how OPD collects and handles
evidence," he continued. "They can't even deal with the resources
they have now."
Professor Shah's observations about the use of networked
surveillance systems for purposes other than crime-fighting is
borne out by official documents and correspondence tracing the
evolution of Oakland's Domain Awareness Center. Public records show
that city staffers are interested in using the DAC to monitor
political protests. This aspect of the DAC first became public in
August when Renee Domingo, director of Oakland's Emergency
Management Services Division and the head of the DAC project team,
published an article in the government trade publication Public CEO
justifying the need for the surveillance hub. "Oakland's long
history of civil discourse and protest adds to the need [for the
Domain Awareness Center]," Domingo wrote. "The Oakland Emergency
Operations Center has been partially or fully activated more than
30 times in the past three years to respond to large demonstrations
and protests."
Other records echo this political mission. In meeting minutes from
a January 2012 meeting of the San Francisco Maritime Exchange's
Northern California Maritime Area Security Committee, Domingo and
Mike O'Brien, director of security for the Port of Oakland,
described the DAC system as a tool that would help control labor
strikes and community protests that threaten to slow business at
the port. Following security reports from the US Border Patrol and
the FBI, Domingo told the committee that Oakland law enforcement
was "hoping that things would quiet down with the Occupy movement
in the new year," according to the official minutes. Domingo
thanked the Maritime Exchange for its support of Oakland's port
security grant projects, which includes the DAC.
O'Brien went further, explaining that the port's Emergency
Operations Center (which now feeds into the DAC) "made use of
seventy new security cameras" to track the protesters, and added
that the system will ensure that "future actions [do] not scare
labor away."
Dan Siegel, a longtime civil and workers' rights attorney in
Oakland, said the city staffers' focus on political unrest, even at
the port, is disturbing. "There's a huge difference in protecting
the port from potential acts of terrorism than from spying on port
workers and others who may have political or economic conflicts
with port management and the companies that operate the terminals,"
said Siegel. "What we see taking place is a complete blurring of
that line where port security now includes tracking Occupy,
longshore workers, and now recently the Port Truckers
Association."
During construction of the first phase of the DAC, from roughly
August 2012 to October 2013, city staffers repeatedly referred to
political protests as a major reason for building the system.
Emails to and from Lieutenant Christopher Shannon, Captain David
Downing, and Lieutenant Nishant Joshi of OPD and Ahsan Baig,
Oakland's technical project leader on the DAC, show that OPD
staffers were in the surveillance center during the Trayvon Martin
protests this year, and that they may have been monitoring marches
in Oakland. In the same chain of emails, Shannon asked if the
Emergency Operations Center and the DAC control room's layout had
"changed much since May Day," referring to yet another large
political rally in Oakland when the DAC appears to have been used
by OPD to monitor demonstrations.
On July 25, Baig requested that SAIC produce a demonstration video
of the DAC's capabilities to show off at the next City Council
meeting. "Try your best. I need the Demo ASAP, it shouldn't be more
than 3 mins.," wrote Baig. "Check out
http://www.occupyoakland.orgwebsite to understand the background."
On July 31, dozens of Oakland residents attended a city council
meeting to speak out against the DAC. The next day, Jerry Green, an
employee of Radio IP, an Oakland contractor, emailed Baig a copy of
a San Francisco Chronicle article entitled, "Oakland OKs Money For
Surveillance Center," that described the protest. The title of
Green's email was "these upset citizens must have something to
hide." Baig responded simply, "Yep..."
Law enforcement surveillance (both federal and local) of
demonstrators has been a constant in Oakland since the killing of
Oscar Grant in 2009 sparked chaotic street demonstrations. Police
infiltrated organizing meetings, sent undercover officers to mingle
in crowds during several demonstrations, and recorded the protests
with multiple video teams. Police took a similar approach during
Occupy Oakland. Police also compiled yearbook-style photo dossiers
of prominent demonstrators, regardless of whether they had
committed a crime or not.
Siegel took issue with the DAC's focus on First Amendment activity.
"The communications among Oakland city staff and DAC contractors
demonstrate their intent to create a surveillance system that goes
far beyond what might be used to detect terrorist threats and help
the OPD solve serious crimes," he said.
"Instead, they are building a system that will be used to monitor
political demonstrations and identify individuals involved in
protests. The city's contractors betray their true attitudes by
describing people opposed to state surveillance as 'upset citizens'
with 'something to hide.'"
In August 2012, when port officials were brainstorming the extent
of the DAC's surveillance powers, they hired a company called
GuidePost Solutions to help. GuidePost Solutions has an office in
Oakland, but is headquartered in Manhattan. Its executives include
former officials from NYPD, the US Attorneys' office, the New York
City District Attorneys' Office, and other law enforcement
agencies. The DAC blueprint that GuidePost Solutions and the port
devised to send to potential contractors as a Request for
Qualifications (RFQ) drew the attention of Oakland police.
Lieutenant Michael Poirier read the plan and criticized it as being
"too Port specific."
"While the DAC will of course serve the Port, I see the majority of
information in/out will be 'live' on City streets," Poirier wrote
in an email to port staffers and to Raymond Kolodzieczak of
GuidePost Solutions. "This RFQ does not have the focus of 'live'
operational information center."
Poirier recommended revising the project description to reflect
OPD's plan to make the DAC a citywide system that includes "any
City camera, shotspotter, LPR [automated license-plate readers],"
and he even added, "City Databases (planning, permits, business
tax, city GIS etc)" as information to be fed into the DAC.
Poirier ended his lengthy email stating, "If the RFQ goes out as
is, I think the vendor will be 'surprised' when the true
nature/function (operational mode) of the DAC is requested."
In public comments to the city council in July, Lye of the ACLU
questioned whether there were any privacy policies in place to
govern how the DAC would collect and store data. There were not.
Lye met with city staffers to discuss the numerous ways the DAC
could serve to undermine civil rights. She said she opposes
construction of the DAC, and that her participation in those policy
meetings should not be taken as ACLU's endorsement of the project.
Councilmembers Dan Kalb and Libby Schaaf subsequently spearheaded a
resolution requiring the city to develop a privacy and data
retention policy, and for the rules to be in place by March, before
the DAC becomes fully operational.
But the city is drafting the policy after the DAC has already been
outfitted with the hardware and software necessary to store massive
amounts of information, including video footage. In a July 26, 2013
email from SAIC employee Neill Chung to port and city staffers
concerning the privacy policy requested by the council, Chung
asserted that the DAC "[does] not record or store any video." He
then wrote exactly the opposite: "The [DAC] operators do have the
ability to save a snapshot from a video and save it to the local
workstation where they can then distribute the image," and further
that they can also save and distribute video. "The [DAC] operators
will have the ability to export a video clip and save it to the
local workstation where they can then distribute the video."
In the same email conversation chain, Oakland project leader Baig
referred to the DAC as having "TB of data storage," meaning
terabytes. Standard DVDs hold 4.7 gigabytes of data, enough for a
couple hours of high-definition digital footage. Many hours of
lower-resolution video footage could be saved in just a few
gigabytes. There are 1024 gigabytes in 1 terabyte. If Baig's claim
that the DAC has terabytes of video storage capacity is correct,
then the DAC is already outfitted with hardware to store the
equivalent of at least 435 full-length movies. And the DAC's
hardware likely has many more hours of storage capacity than that.
After the council approved Kalb and Schaaf's resolution requiring
creation of a privacy policy, city staffers appear to have
strategized a way to work around the council's intentions so that
they can build upon these DAC features. In an email exchange on
July 26 between Domingo and Amadis Sotelo, a lawyer in the City
Attorney's Office, the two discussed their revisions to the privacy
policy. Sotelo remarked that the resolution language under
consideration "limits you from being able to develop and implement
data retention at later times."
"Is that your intention?" Sotelo asked Domingo.
"No, we want the flexibility to do this after Council approves the
Policy," replied Domingo.
Baig then cut into the email exchange, asking Domingo, "How are you
going to change after the Council approval?"
Domingo responded, "We've done this before recently. Amadis and I
will handle it."
"It looks like city staff thinks they have flexibility to alter the
policy after council approves it," said Lye of ACLU. "That raises
huge questions."
City staffers involved in the project and the email exchanges
didn't return our phone calls and emails during the month we spent
reporting this story. The project's contractors also declined to
speak to us. Councilmembers Kalb and Schaaf also did not respond to
repeated requests for comment.
Siegel reviewed the above email exchange and many other records at
our request. "I think they're trying to pull the wool over the eyes
of the city council and the ACLU about what data is stored and
what's not," he said. He added that other records show that whether
or not the city's policies end up allowing the DAC to centrally
warehouse video, the footage will still be saved and accessible.
"They'll have incident markers, links that allow them to pull up
footage from its source," he said. "So what difference does it make
if they're storing it in the DAC or not?"
The city's data retention policy is currently being drafted by the
Oakland Police Department under the supervision of Deputy Chief
Eric Breshears and the City Attorney's Office.
Oakland resident Mary Madden, a member of the Oakland Privacy
Working Group, opposes the DAC unequivocally. She said OPD's role
in the surveillance system's construction and in drafting privacy
policies raises even more problems. "If Oakland would like to give
the impression of caring about privacy, they should have the
privacy guidelines crafted by an independent privacy expert, who
understands the complex issues at stake, as well as the full DAC
system and all its components," she said. "OPD has a history of not
following their own rules, as the federal monitor pointed out.
Examples include the crowd control policy and use of lapel cameras,
so how can we trust OPD to follow their own privacy rules for the
DAC?"
Once the Domain Awareness Center's Phase 2 construction is finished
in July 2014, the center could link an untold number of public and
private video cameras from businesses, traffic intersections,
public housing properties, highways and onramps, transit stations,
sports facilities, and public schools into a centralized hub. The
DAC will also collect OPD's automated license-plate reader data,
ShotSpotter gunshot detectors, and social media feeds ? all to be
monitored on a live basis.
July 2013 emails between SAIC project manager Taso Zografos and
Chris Millar, a contractor hired to help oversee the DAC, identify
sources of data and surveillance capabilities that would be built
into the DAC in several phases. According to the emails, the first
phase of "prioritized integrations" included the port's vehicle
tracking system and its mapping systems, weather and seismic
warnings, and video from BART and the Oakland Airport. The second
group of "prioritized integrations" included police and fire
dispatch, automatic vehicle location systems for OPD and OFD
vehicles, video from Caltrans and California Highway Patrol
cameras, and unspecified informational links between the DAC and
two law enforcement "fusion centers" ? hubs in which law
enforcement intelligence is centralized ? including the Northern
California Regional Information Center. Oakland officials are also
considering applying for grant funding for the DAC on the basis
that it also operates as a fusion center. Such a designation could
open up the DAC for funding sources additional to the federal
grants that have bankrolled it to date.
According to the emails, "potential integrations" into the DAC
include video feeds from the Oakland Coliseum, Oakland's red-light
cameras, AC Transit, BART, city libraries, City Hall, Oakland
Housing Authority properties, buildings owned by the Oakland
Unified School District, and OPD's automated license-plate
readers.
If the public housing, school, and public transit cameras are
incorporated into the DAC, Oakland's communities of color could be
placed under disproportionately intense surveillance. "In many
instances, surveillance issues aren't just privacy issues; they're
also racial justice issues," said Lye. "This means we're going to
have complete surveillance of communities of color when they're
going about their lives and doing nothing wrong whatsoever."
A critical component of the Domain Awareness Center will be "video
analytics," or software that can interpret raw information from
video streams and identify certain behavior or characteristics. The
port already uses motion-detection software and image recognition
around port property as part of a virtual fence that alerts
staffers if someone is approaching facilities that are off-limits
to the public. Emails between city and port officials in May
revealed that port staffers have programmed port cameras to send
email alerts when the video analytics detect cars engaged in street
racing on Middle Harbor Road. The new technology has not put a halt
to the chaotic and occasionally violent races.
The most controversial form of video analytics is facial
recognition software that is programmed to automatically identify
persons based on unique facial features. Source databases for
facial recognition programs include employee records, DMV photos,
and mugshots from law enforcement booking systems. The city council
voted in July to bar the use of facial recognition during the DAC's
current funding phase. However, facial recognition for
closed-circuit television systems is rapidly gaining popularity
among law enforcement. In January 2013, the Los Angeles Police
Department began testing mobile surveillance cameras equipped with
facial recognition software in the San Fernando Valley, with the
intent of identifying known or wanted criminals. The Chicago Office
of Emergency Services has also experimented with facial recognition
programming for its 24,000 networked cameras, using Cook County's
4.5 million booking photos as the data source. In May, Chicago
police officers made their first arrest with the help of facial
recognition technology.
Shah of the University of Illinois-Chicago noted that the combined
use of facial recognition technology and license-plate readers,
which would be possible if the former technology is used in
conjunction with the Oakland surveillance center, have the
potential to take individual tracking to an unprecedented level.
"Facial recognition and LPR directly tie to someone ? [it's] what
causes the most concern," said Shah.
The DAC is only one of several surveillance systems in progress in
Oakland. In June 2012, then-Oakland Police Chief Howard Jordan and
then-Assistant Chief Anthony Toribio met with representatives of
the Total Recall Corporation, a firm marketing a surveillance
system called CrimeEye. Total Recall's cameras can zoom in from
great distances, and can store footage for as long as a police
department wants. If OPD opts to buy this camera unit and software
package, a single unit at the intersection of 14th Street and
Broadway could have a range east to Lake Merritt, north to the
Paramount Theater, and south and west to Interstate 880, according
to materials the company provided to the city that we obtained.
In August, then-Oakland Chamber of Commerce Vice President Paul
Junge and city staffer Joe DeVries exchanged emails about
incorporating cameras owned and operated by the Downtown Oakland
Association and Lake Merritt Uptown District Association business
improvement districts into the Domain Awareness Center during phase
three of the DAC construction in June 2014. DeVries also mentioned
the possibility of including cameras installed by various
neighborhood associations in the DAC.
Documents we obtained also reveal the Uptown and downtown BIDs are
building their own surveillance center, and have submitted a
$30,000 grant application to the MetLife Foundation to fund it. At
some future date these cameras are also to be linked into the DAC.
In an influential 2012 paper about police surveillance
technologies, Georgetown University law professor Laura Donohue
observed that surveillance advances like facial recognition,
vehicle tracking, and networked video monitoring are altering the
nature of American society. "What we are witnessing is a sea change
in how we think about individuals in public space," Donohue wrote.
While Oakland's elected officials and city staff struggle with how
to regulate this sprawling surveillance project, abstract issues
such as privacy and security have become immediate and concrete for
many city residents.
But the courts, as Donohue noted, are decades behind the newly
ubiquitous surveillance methods. In one recent case ? US v. Jones ?
that bought the law partly up to speed, the DC Court of Appeals
ruled that law enforcement officers violated the Constitution by
placing GPS trackers on vehicles without warrants. (This ruling was
later upheld by the US Supreme Court.) In the unanimous US v. Jones
decision, DC Court of Appeals Justice Douglas Ginsberg wrote of the
incredible power modern technology affords law enforcement: "A
person who knows all of another's travels can deduce whether he is
a weekly churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an
unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups ? and not
just one fact about a person, but all such facts."
The DAC, if completed as it's currently designed, will make Judge
Ginsberg's scenarios a reality in Oakland.
Included below is the East Bay Express' unbelievable exposé on the
Domain Awareness Center being built in Oakland. While it is
extraordinarily shocking what the plans are, it is within the
dystopia scope of what civil rights advocates have been concerned
about. It is also amazingly shocking how much has been exposed and
documented about it already.
These developments require a powerful response and should be a top
priority for awareness raising in 2014. Not just protests, but
serious and thoughtful articulation of the profound implications of
this turning point of freedom in this country and specifically this
city.
sent from
eddan.com
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