Yo's-
Re. Eddan's & Sonja's question, "what currently legal behavior does this
prohibit?"
At present it's entirely legal to consensually record oneself & partner
having sex, and then non-consensually publish the recording on a site
where the associated verbiage has the direct effect of exposing the
victim to emotional abuse from members of the general public. This is
what the statute seeks to prohibit.
The statute Eddan quoted below isn't the revenge porn (RP) statute, it's
a different one that refers to recording people without/against their
consent in times/places where by definition there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy (bedrooms, bathrooms, and the like).
In the 1980s, stalking was also a new area of the law, and liberty
issues were raised about anti-stalking laws. Prior to that time, all a
victim could do was get a restraining order or try to have a stalker
charged with trespassing. Over the past 30 years those issues have been
settled with no adverse effect on liberty.
Just to be clear what we're dealing with, here are a couple of articles
about Hunter Moore, whose RP site made news (beware, reading this stuff
may make you want to vomit):
Forbes raises the Anthony Weiner issue but that's clearly irrelevant:
the California law excludes "selfies" or photos one takes of oneself.
Weiner's photos were selfies, thus excluded from protection. Case
closed, no hypothetical here.
The main problem I have with the statute as written, is "intent."
Proving intent can be notoriously difficult. What I would prefer is to
prohibit the act itself of publishing, without consent to publish, any
recording made in a place/time where there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Not just bedrooms and bathrooms, but any area of a private
residence or private vehicle. If you have a vulnerable conversation
with someone in their living room or in their car or on a tandem
bicycle, the fact that it was not a bedroom and you were not naked,
should not abrogate your expectation of privacy. (I'll happily debate
this issue in a separate thread.)
In fact the two-party recording notification laws in many states already
cover this aspect, though they are not sufficient by themselves to stop
RP. Consent to record, by itself (such as where someone consents to
their partner recording them having sex), does not also constitute
consent to publish. These are two different things, that need to be
addressed separately.
Press articles on the RP statute refer to opposition by the ACLU. I
searched on Ixquick and DuckDuckGo (privacy-protected search engines
that don't search you in return) and found nothing; I searched
and found nothing. So if anyone can find an ACLU statement on this,
please post a link.
Re. "speech" claims in regard to RP: The attribution of person-rights
to "speech" is analogous to the attribution of person-rights to
corporations, and muddies the issue. A corporation is not a natural
person, it's a legal entity formed to conduct business. "Speech" is not
a person, it's an act performed by persons, or the product of such an
act. Words, images, and so on, do not spontaneously come into
existence: they are created by persons.
"Freedom of speech" is the unalienable right of persons to speak
(publish, etc.), subject only to the rarest and most limited
restrictions, such as against child pornography. And here the issue of
RP comes home to roost: Child pornography is banned precisely because a
child cannot give legal consent, and recording or publication in the
absence of consent is a form of harm with an identifiable victim. The
deep structure of RP statutes is the same principle, that
non-consensuality is a form of harm against an identifiable victim. The
a-priori "_cannot_ give consent" and the empirical "_did not_ give
consent" have the same effect: no consent is/was given, and harm was done.
The RP statute does not apply to "selfies" or if the person gives
consent to be published (as with consenting adult porn). It does not
apply if the person is not identifiable from the published material, a
more liberal provision than with regard to child porn. It only applies
if the person is identifiable and does not give consent. That is as
minimal a restraint on the right of a person to publish an image or
video, as could possibly be enacted.
As with anti-stalking laws, over the course of time it will become clear
that no liberty interest, and no unalienable right, is involved here.
-G.
=====
On 13-10-09-Wed 11:42 AM, Sonja Trauss wrote:
I have the same q as the Forbes' author - what
currently legal
behavior does this prohibit?
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013, Eddan Katz wrote:
CA Senate Bill SB-255 - now §647(j)(4) as of Oct. 1 - is first
'revenge porn' law in the US.
Eric Goldman (awesome Santa Clara Law prof) has an interesting
analysis on the legal implications -
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californias-new-law-show….
If anyone has some technical observations or other feedback, I'd
be interested to hear other takes on this. Seems like a very
tricky socio-technical problem.
§647
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-0…
647. Except as provided in subdivision (l),
every person who
commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor:
(a) Who solicits anyone to engage in or who engages in lewd or
dissolute conduct in any public place or in any place open to the
public or exposed to public view.
(b) Who solicits or who agrees to engage in or who engages in any
act of prostitution. A person agrees to engage in an act of
prostitution when, with specific intent to so engage, he or she
manifests an acceptance of an offer or solicitation to so engage,
regardless of whether the offer or solicitation was made by a person
who also possessed the specific intent to engage in prostitution. No
agreement to engage in an act of prostitution shall constitute a
violation of this subdivision unless some act, in addition to the
agreement, is done within this state in furtherance of the
commission
of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing
to engage in that
act. As used in this subdivision, "prostitution" includes any lewd
act between persons for money or other consideration.
(c) Who accosts other persons in any public place or in any place
open to the public for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms.
(d) Who loiters in or about any toilet open to the public for the
purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any
unlawful act.
(e) Who lodges in any building, structure, vehicle, or place,
whether public or private, without the permission of the owner or
person entitled to the possession or in control of it.
(f) Who is found in any public place under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, any drug, controlled substance, toluene, or any
combination of any intoxicating liquor, drug, controlled substance,
or toluene, in a condition that he or she is unable to exercise care
for his or her own safety or the safety of others, or by reason of
his or her being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, any
drug, controlled substance, toluene, or any combination of any
intoxicating liquor, drug, or toluene, interferes with or obstructs
or prevents the free use of any street, sidewalk, or other public
way.
(g) When a person has violated subdivision (f), a peace officer,
if he or she is reasonably able to do so, shall place the person, or
cause him or her to be placed, in civil protective custody. The
person shall be taken to a facility, designated pursuant to Section
5170 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, for the 72-hour treatment
and evaluation of inebriates. A peace officer may place a person in
civil protective custody with that kind and degree of force which
would be lawful were he or she effecting an arrest for a misdemeanor
without a warrant. No person who has been placed in civil protective
custody shall thereafter be subject to any criminal prosecution or
juvenile court proceeding based on the facts giving rise to this
placement. This subdivision shall not apply to the following
persons:
(1) Any person who is under the influence of
any drug, or under
the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any drug.
(2) Any person who a peace officer has probable cause to believe
has committed any felony, or who has committed any misdemeanor in
addition to subdivision (f).
(3) Any person who a peace officer in good faith believes will
attempt escape or will be unreasonably difficult for medical
personnel to control.
(h) Who loiters, prowls, or wanders upon the private property of
another, at any time, without visible or lawful business with the
owner or occupant. As used in this subdivision, "loiter" means to
delay or linger without a lawful purpose for being on the property
and for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be
discovered.
(i) Who, while loitering, prowling, or wandering upon the private
property of another, at any time, peeks in the door or window of any
inhabited building or structure, without visible or lawful business
with the owner or occupant.
(j) (1) Any person who looks through a hole or opening, into, or
otherwise views, by means of any instrumentality, including, but not
limited to, a periscope, telescope, binoculars, camera, motion
picture camera, camcorder, or mobile phone, the interior of a
bedroom, bathroom, changing room, fitting room, dressing room, or
tanning booth, or the interior of any other area in which the
occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to
invade the privacy of a person or persons inside. This subdivision
shall not apply to those areas of a private business used to count
currency or other negotiable instruments.
(2) Any person who uses a concealed camcorder, motion picture
camera, or photographic camera of any type, to secretly videotape,
film, photograph, or record by electronic means, another,
identifiable person under or through the clothing being worn by that
other person, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the
undergarments worn by, that other person, without the consent or
knowledge of that other person, with the intent to arouse,
appeal to,
or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires
of that person and
invade the privacy of that other person, under circumstances in
which
the other person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
(3) (A) Any person who uses a concealed camcorder, motion picture
camera, or photographic camera of any type, to secretly videotape,
film, photograph, or record by electronic means, another,
identifiable person who may be in a state of full or partial
undress,
for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the
undergarments worn
by, that other person, without the consent or knowledge of that
other
person, in the interior of a bedroom, bathroom,
changing room,
fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth, or the interior
of any
other area in which that other person has a
reasonable expectation
of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of that other
person.
(B) Neither of the following is a defense to the crime specified
in this paragraph:
(i) The defendant was a cohabitant, landlord, tenant, cotenant,
employer, employee, or business partner or associate of the victim,
or an agent of any of these.
(ii) The victim was not in a state of full or partial undress.
(k) In any accusatory pleading charging a violation of
subdivision
(b), if the defendant has been once previously
convicted of a
violation of that subdivision, the previous conviction shall be
charged in the accusatory pleading. If the previous conviction is
found to be true by the jury, upon a jury trial, or by the court,
upon a court trial, or is admitted by the defendant, the defendant
shall be imprisoned in a county jail for a period of not less
than 45
days and shall not be eligible for release upon
completion of
sentence, on probation, on parole, on work furlough or work release,
or on any other basis until he or she has served a period of not
less
than 45 days in a county jail. In all cases in
which probation is
granted, the court shall require as a condition thereof that the
person be confined in a county jail for at least 45 days. In no
event
does the court have the power to absolve a person
who violates this
subdivision from the obligation of spending at least 45 days in
confinement in a county jail.
In any accusatory pleading charging a violation of subdivision
(b), if the defendant has been previously convicted two or more
times
of a violation of that subdivision, each of these
previous
convictions shall be charged in the accusatory pleading. If two or
more of these previous convictions are found to be true by the jury,
upon a jury trial, or by the court, upon a court trial, or are
admitted by the defendant, the defendant shall be imprisoned in a
county jail for a period of not less than 90 days and shall not be
eligible for release upon completion of sentence, on probation, on
parole, on work furlough or work release, or on any other basis
until
he or she has served a period of not less than 90
days in a county
jail. In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall
require as a condition thereof that the person be confined in a
county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the court
have the
power to absolve a person who violates this
subdivision from the
obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in a county
jail.
In addition to any punishment prescribed by this section, a court
may suspend, for not more than 30 days, the privilege of the person
to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 13201.5 of the
Vehicle
Code for any violation of subdivision (b) that
was committed within
1,000 feet of a private residence and with the use of a vehicle. In
lieu of the suspension, the court may order a person's privilege to
operate a motor vehicle restricted, for not more than six months, to
necessary travel to and from the person's place of employment or
education. If driving a motor vehicle is necessary to perform the
duties of the person's employment, the court may also allow the
person to drive in that person's scope of employment.
(l) (1) A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (j) is
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year,
or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both
that fine and imprisonment.
(2) If the victim of a violation of subdivision (j) was a
minor at
the time of the offense, the violation is
punishable by imprisonment
in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both that fine and
imprisonment.
_______________________________________________
sudo-discuss mailing list
sudo-discuss(a)lists.sudoroom.org <javascript:;>
http://lists.sudoroom.org/listinfo/sudo-discuss
_______________________________________________
sudo-discuss mailing list
sudo-discuss(a)lists.sudoroom.org
http://lists.sudoroom.org/listinfo/sudo-discuss